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BLUEPRINT FOR WHALE CONSERVATION:
IMPLEMENTING THE MARINE MAMMAL
PROTECTION ACT
Nina M. Young* and Suzanne Iudicello**
I. INTRODUCTION
Over its twenty-four year history, the Marine Mammal Protection Act
of 19721 (MMPA) has had both its successes and its failures, yet it
remains one of the cornerstones of marine conservation and one of the
most effective mechanisms to protect marine mammals. Marine mammals
now face threats, however, that are global in scope and involve humans
and our shared use of the marine environment. Diminishing marine
resources and diminishing federal funds force fishers and conservationists
to develop creative initiatives to conserve marine mammals, marine
habitats, and species diversity, while still promoting economically viable
fisheries.
Marine mammals often compete with humans for the same fish, or
occur in areas where fishing is conducted. As a result they are sometimes
incidentally taken during commercial fishing operations. The regulation
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1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421(h) (1994).
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of such operations to protect marine mammals has become a critical, and
often volatile, issue. Since its enactment, the MMPA has prohibited the
take of marine mammals incidental to commercial fishing unless autho-
rized by an incidental take permit or a small take exemption.
The problem of the incidental take of marine mammals in commercial
fishing reached a climax in 1988, when it became apparent that the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) was unable to make the
necessary determinations that would enable it to authorize takes for
affected marine mammal stocks. The resulting Kokechik Fishermen's
Association v. Secretary of Commerce2 court decision uncovered the
permit-issuing system's inherent flaw: the fact that the information upon
which permit-issuing decisions were being made was not sufficient to be
certain that incidental takes would not harm marine mammal stocks. This
discovery brought together representatives of the environmental commu-
nity and the fishing industry in 1988 to find a way to enable fishers to
fish, while minimizing the impact of their activities on marine mammals.
These representatives agreed on a series of points which they subsequently
presented to the Senate Commerce Committee and the House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee. Based on these points, Congress passed
the MMPA Amendments of 1988, which established an information
gathering program and an Interim Exemption Program for Commercial
Fisheries.
After analysis of the Interim Exemption Program and after NMFS
proposed a long-term regime to authorize incidental takes in commercial
fisheries in 1993, the environmental community and the fishing industry
met again. They developed amendments that resulted in sweeping changes
to the MMPA's provisions governing the incidental take of marine
mammals in commercial fisheries, which were adopted by Congress in
1994.' Today, representatives of the fishing industry, the conservation
community, and federal and state agencies continue their work through
incidental take reduction teams to develop measures reducing the inciden-
tal mortality and serious injury of marine mammals in commercial
fisheries.
Part II of this Article explores the history of the MMPA and explains
why this type of cooperative approach promises to be effective for marine
2. Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1361.
1997] Blueprint for Whale Conservation: Implementing the MMPA 151
mammal conservation. Part III examines the benefits of developing
conservation strategies using facilitated negotiations versus traditional
adversarial tactics, and how these strategies expedite efforts to reduce or
eliminate marine mammal mortality in commercial fisheries. Part IV
provides an update on the status of the implementation of the 1994
Amendments to the MMPA, and Part V evaluates the effectiveness of
using take reduction teams to develop management strategies to reduce
marine mammal incidental mortality and serious injury. Finally, this
Article concludes by identifying areas of potential conflict between the
fishing industry and the conservation community in the next reauthoriza-
tion of the MMPA.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION Acr
A. Legislative History
The Marine Mammal Protection Act is perhaps the most comprehensive
marine mammal conservation and management legislation in the world.4
Passed to rectify the consequences of "man's impact upon marine mam-
mals [which] has ranged from what might be termed malign neglect to
virtual genocide,"' the Act governs all harassing, catching, and killing of
marine mammals by U.S. citizens or within U.S. jurisdiction.6 Its pur-
pose is to protect marine mammal species of "great international signifi-
cance, esthetic and recreational as well as economic."7 The species
included under the Act are whales, dolphins, porpoises, seals, sea lions,
4. Natasha Atkins, Summa'y ofNational Laws and InternationalAgreements Affecting
River Dolphins, in BIOLOGY AND CONSERvATION OF THE RIvER DOLPHINS; 3 Occasional
Papers of the IUCN Species Survival Commission (SSC) 168, 173 (1987). See also Nina
M. Young, Is the Marine Mammal Protection Act a Marketable Commodity to Resolve the
Over-Exploitation of Marine Mammals in Commercial Fisheries? 23 PROC. INT'L Ass'N
AQUATIC ANIMAL MED. 72 (1992).
5. See H.R. REP. No. 92-707, at 11 (1971) (reporting on H.R. 10420, proposed
legislation for marine mammal protection).
6. Id.
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6) (1994).
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walruses, sea otters, manatees, dugongs, and polar bears.8 The Act is
enforced by the U.S. Departments of Commerce and Interior.
B. The MMPA's Moratorium on Taking
The goal of the MMPA is to "protect and encourage marine mammals
to develop to the greatest extent feasible commensurate with sound
policies of resource management."9 Another of the Act's purposes is to
"maintain the health and stability of the marine ecosystem.""0 Congress
also mandated that whenever consistent with these goals, marine mammals
are to be protected and managed so that they do not "cease to be a
significant functioning element of the ecosystem of which they are a
part"' or "diminish below their optimum sustainable population (OSP)." 2
A species or population stock that is determined to be below its OSP level,
or is listed as endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), is designated as "depleted" under the MMPA.'3
8. Id. § 1362(6). As explained in § 1362(6):
The term "marine mammal" means any mammal which-(A) is morphologically
adapted to the marine environment (including sea otters and members of the orders
Sirenia, Pinnipedia and Cetacea), or (B) primarily inhabits the marine environment
(such as the polar bear); and, for the purposes of this chapter, includes any part of any
such marine mammal, including its raw, dressed, or dyed fur or skin.
9. Id. § 1361(6).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 1361(2).
12. Id. "'[O]ptimum sustainable population' means, with respect to any population
stock, the number of animals that will result in the maximum productivity of the population
or the species, keeping in mind the carrying capacity of the habitat and the health of the
ecosystem of which they form a constituent element." Id. § 1362(9). See also 50 C.F.R. §
216.3 (1996), stating:
[O]ptimum sustainable population is a population size which falls within a range from
the population level of a given species or stock which is the largest supportable within
the ecosystem to the population level that results in maximum net productivity.
Maximum net productivity is the greatest net annual increment in population numbers
or biomass resulting from additions to the population due to reproduction and/or
growth less losses due to natural mortality.
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(1) (1994).
The term "depletion" or "depleted" means any case in which-
(A) the Secretary, after consultation with the Marine Mammal Commission and
the Committee of Scientific Advisors on Marine Mammals established under
subchapter III of this chapter, determines that a species or population stock is
below its optimum sustainable population;
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Congress sought to achieve broad protection for marine mammals by
establishing a moratorium on importation and taking. 14 The MMPA states
that the "incidental kill or incidental serious injury of marine mammals
permitted in the course of commercial fishing operations be reduced to
insignificant levels approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate."15
The MMPA allows the Secretary of Commerce 16 to waive the morato-
rium by issuing a general permit for taking a marine mammal species. A
waiver is allowed if the best available scientific evidence reveals that the
take would not disadvantage a specific marine mammal population. 7
Actions that may be governed under a general permit include the inciden-
tal taking of marine mammals in commercial fisheries, 8 the taking and
importation for the purpose of scientific research, 9 public display,2"
enhancing the recovery of a marine mammal population,2' and the
importation of polar bear parts taken from sport hunts in Canada.2
(B) a State, to which authority for the conservation and management of a species or
population stock is transferred under section 109, determines that such species or stock is
below its optimum sustainable population; or
(C) a species or population stock is listed as an endangered species or a threatened species
under the Endangered Species Act of 1973.
IM
14. Id. § 1371. "The term 'take' means to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to
harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal." IM § 1362(13).
15. Id § 1371(a)(2). See also Mary M. Sauer, Comment, Balancing Marine Mammal
Protection Against Commercial Fishing: The Zero Mortality Goal, Quotas, and the Gulf of
Maine Harbor Porpoise, 45 ME. L. REV. 419 (1993) (presenting a more detailed review of
the legislative history of the zero mortality rate goal).
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a)(2), 1373, 1374 (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 220 (1996) (stating
general permit procedures). The MMPA gives the Secretary of Commerce, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) the authority to issue permits and
regulations governing the taking of marine mammals under the order Cetacea (including
whales, dolphins, and porpoises) and members, other than walruses, of the order Pinnipedia
(including sea lions and seals). Responsibility of all other marine mammals covered by the
MMPA is given to the Secretary of Interior. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2), (3)(A) (1994).
18. Id. § 1374(a).
19. Id. § 1374(c)(I)-(3).
20. Id. § 1374(c)(2).
21. Id. § 1374(c)(4).
22. Id. § 1374(c)(5).
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A general permit is obtained through a procedure' based on the
following elements: First, the permit is issued with regulations, developed
after notice and opportunity for comment and an on-the-record agency
hearing.24 Second, the record must describe the evidence presented to the
Secretary by the permit applicant (e.g., the fisher), who must meet the
burden of proof.25 Third, the applicant must demonstrate that the take
level authorized will not disadvantage the species or be inconsistent with
MMPA purposes and policies (e.g. the population is at OSP).26 Fourth,
the permit is to be based on the best scientific information available.27
Further, all relevant factors are to be given full consideration by the
Secretary, including take levels, treaty obligations, marine ecosystem and
related considerations, the conservation, development, and utilization of
fishery resources, and the economic and technological feasibility of
implementation. Finally, when applying these factors, a conservative
bias is to be applied in favor of the well-being of marine mammals.29
Once the Secretary determines that the applicant has met this burden, a
general permit to take marine mammals in the course of commercial
fishing is issued.
In 1981, after recognizing that the general permit system was burden-
some and required more flexibility, Congress amended the MMPA to
create a simplified procedure for "small takes" of marine mammals
incidental to commercial fishing operations.30 This exemption is limited
to taking small numbers of non-depleted3' marine mammal species by
U.S. citizens engaged in commercial fishing operations.32 This exemption
can be issued for terms of five years if, after an opportunity for public
23. The general permit procedure, although providing a mechanism to allow takes in
commercial fisheries, reaffirms the Act's goal to reduce incidental take to "insignificant
levels approaching a zero.., rate." 16 U.S.C. §§ 1374(d)(3), 1371(a)(2) (1994).
24. Id. § 1373(d).
25. Id. § 1374(d)(3).
26. Id. § 1373(d)(2).
27. Id. § 1373(a).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1373(b)(I)-(5) (1994).
29. Id. § 1373(d)-(f).
30. Id. § 1371(a)(4) (1994). See also H.R. REP. No. 97-228, at 18 (1981),
reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1458, 1459, 1468.
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(3)(B) (1994) (denying the National Marine Fisheries
Service the ability to issue a general permit for incidental take in commercial
fisheries of species or populations designated as "depleted" under the MMPA).
32. Id. § 1383a(b)(2)(B), (C).
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comment, the Secretary finds that the total take will have a "negligible
impact" on the stock3 and the Secretary issues guidelines for a cooperative
monitoring system for those involved in such take.34 The exemption can
be withdrawn if the take becomes more than negligible."
C. Analysis of Implementation-General Permits
In U.S. and Foreign Fisheries 1974-1988
Aside from the yelowfin tuna purse seine fishery, the general permit
procedures of the MMPA have been applied through on-the-record
proceedings regulating the operations of one fishery, the Japanese high
seas salmon fleet inside the U.S. 200-mile exclusive economic zone.36 In
1981,11 after extensive on-the-record hearings," NMFS issued a
33. "Negligible impact is an impact resulting from the specified activity that cannot be
reasonably expected to, and is not reasonably likely to, adversely affect the species or stock
through effects on annual rates of recruitment or survival." 50 C.F.R. § 228.3 (1994).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(4) (1994). Congress intended this exemption to be available
for fishers whose taking of marine mammals is "infrequent, unavoidable, or accidental."
H.R. REP. No. 97-228, reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1458, 1469.
35. H.R REP. No. 97-228, reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1469. See also 50 C.F.R.
§§ 228.4- .5 (1988).
36. MARINE MAMMAL COMMIssION, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 45-46
(1982). On February 4, 1981, the National Marine Fisheries Service published a notice of
a formal hearing to be conducted before an administrative law judge in order to determine
whether the affected populations of Dall's porpoise were at the optimum sustainable
population level, and, if so, to promulgate quotas and other provisions governing their
incidental taking after June 9, 1981. Id. at 46.
37. A protocol amending The International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of
the North Pacific Ocean (INPFC), renegotiated in 1978, permitted the Japanese to fish for
salmon within and outside the United States' 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
subject to a coordinated U.S.-Japan research program on the incidental taking of Dali's
porpoise and other marine mammals. The Annex to the Protocol and the amendments to the
United States' North Pacific Fisheries Act, implementing the INPFC, exempted the Japanese
salmon fishing vessels from the incidental take permit requirements of the MMPA until June
9, 1981. After June 9, 1981, Japanese salmon fishing operations within the U.S. EEZ would
be subject to the general permit requirements of the MMPA. Protocol Amending the
International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, Apr. 25,
1978, 30 U.S.T. 1095. See MARNE MAMMAL COMMSSION, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 45 (1982).
38. Hearings were held in Seattle, Washington on March 5 and 6, 1981. For a
summary of the findings of the ALJ and the comments of the Marine Mammal Com-
mission, see MRiNE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 46
(1982).
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Cooperative Association (Federation) to take, incidental to its salmon drift
gillnet fishery, up to 5,500 Dali's porpoise, 450 northern fur seals, and
twenty-five northern sea lions each year.3 9 This permit required observ-
ers, gear research, innovation, 4 and was extended until 1987 by the 1982
amendments to the North Pacific Fisheries Act.41 These amendments
placed a heavy emphasis on the use of new fisheries gear that would
reduce take and advance the MMPA zero mortality rate goal.42
In 1987, after on-the-record hearings, the Administrative Law Judge
(AU) presiding over the Federation's application recommended that a
permit be issued for five years with initial annual quotas of 1,750 for
Dali's porpoise and forty-five for northern fur seals.43 To advance the
zero mortality goal, the ALJ recommended an annual five percent
reduction in the quota and directed additional research on gear improve-
ment. 44
The final NMFS decision set larger annual quotas, but limited the
aggregate Dall's porpoise take over the three year permit term to 5,250
from the North Pacific Ocean stock (1,750 average annual take) and 789
from the Bering Sea stock (263 average annual take). 45 NMFS denied the
permit request to take northern fur seals and sea lions because the
Federation failed to meet its burden to show that the affected stocks were
within their optimum sustainable population levels and that the projected
39. Taking of Marine Mammals Incident to Commercial Fishing Operations, 46 Fed.
Reg. 27,056 (1981).
40. Id.
41. Fisheries Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-389, § 201, 96 Stat. 1949, 1949-51
(1982) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1823). The Fisheries Amendments of 1982, passed by the
House of Representatives and the Senate on December 10, 1982, and signed by the President
on December 29, 1982, amended the North Pacific Fisheries Act to extend the permit issued
to the Japanese until June 9, 1987 and require Japanese fishing vessels to adopt new fishing
gear and techniques to reduce incidental taking of porpoise, and develop plans for
monitoring and research. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 45-46 (1982).
42. Pub. L. No 97-389, § 201, 96 Stat. at 1949-51.
43. See Regulations Governing the Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, 52 Fed.
Reg. 19,874 (1987). See also, MARINE MAMMAL COMMIsSION, 1987 ANNUAL REPORTTO
CONGRESS 145-46 (1988) (reviewing the 1987 permit process).
44. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 145-46
(1988).
45. See Regulations Governing the Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, 52 Fed.
Reg. 19,874 (1987).
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levels of take would not disadvantage those stocks. Observer coverage and
gear modification requirements were included.46
D. Implementation-The Kokechik Decision and Other Cases
Shortly after fishery operations began in 1987, the general permit was
legally challenged in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
by the Kokechik Fishermen's Association.47
On June 15, 1987, the district court preliminarily enjoined the general
permit, because the Federation had not met its burden to show that the
inevitable take of fur seals would meet MMPA standards. As such, no
fishing could be authorized.4" The Kokechik Fishermen's Association and
the Center for Environmental Education successfully demonstrated that the
permit would unlawfully allow the taking of one species, Dali's porpoise,
even though it was known that other species would be taken by the same
fishing operations.49
The Federation and the Secretary of Commerce appealed the decision,
which was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.50 This effectively invalidated the permit and prohibited the
Japanese fleet from operating within U.S. waters. The appeals court
stated that the Secretary of Commerce had no authority to disregard
incidental takings of certain species or stocks in issuing a permit that
authorizes the take of another species or stock, without first determining
whether the population of each species was at the OSP level, even if the
impact on the species was negligible.51 The decision meant that NMFS
could not issue general permits in the absence of definitive findings that
the take of all marine mammals expected to occur in a particular fishery
would pass the "will not disadvantage the species" and "consistency with
46. Id.
47. Federation of Japan Salmon Fisheries Coop. Ass'n. v. Baldridge, 679 F. Supp. 37
(D.D.C. 1987). The suit was brought by the Kokechik Fishermen's Association, representing
Alaskan subsistence fishermen, the Center for Environmental Education, now known as the
Center for Marine Conservation, Greenpeace, and other environmental groups.
48. Id at 46-47, 49.
49. Id. at 46. See also MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 147 (1988).
50. Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989).
51. Id. at 802-03.
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MMPA purposes and policies" tests of section 103 of the MMPA.5 2 Of
particular significance was the court's conclusion that the agency could
not issue a permit that would result in the take of a depleted species. 3
Finally, the court stated that "[t]he MMPA does not allow for a Solomonic
balancing of the animals' and fisheries' interest such as the Secretary
attempted."54
E. Effect of the Kokechik Decision
Other than the tuna/dolphin and salmon/Dali's porpoise issues, no
fisheries have been required to obtain incidental take authorizations
through formal general permit procedures. 5 Although NMFS issued
numerous general permits to domestic fisheries from 1974 on, and to
foreign fisheries operating within U.S. waters since 1977,56 none of these
were developed through on-the-record rulemaking proceedings. 7 In fact,
for most of these permits, the permittees and NMFS recognized that NMFS
lacked sufficient information on the status of affected populations, take
rates, fishing effort, and other factors necessary to make the determinations
required by section 103 of the MMPA. s These serious deficiencies caused
52. Id.
53. Id. at 802.
54. Id. See Sauer, supra note 15, at 441-47.
55. See generally KATHRYN 0' HARA ET AL., CENTER FOR MARINE CONSERVATION,
MARINE WILDLIFE ENTANGLEMENT IN NORTH AMERICA 173-75 (1986). NMFS's failure to
apply the general permit requirement in an even-handed manner was attributable, according
to the agency, to the fact that all its resources were focused on the tuna/dolphin and Dalls
porpoise/salmon fishing permits. There were no recognized serious interactions in other
fisheries that would have merited re-programming funding and effort, said an agency
official. Further, the agency pointed out, the inability to gather the extent of information
necessary for formal rulemaking to waive the moratorium was one reason for the small take
exemption enacted in 1981. Bo Bricklemeyer & Suzanne Iudicello, The Reasons for the
Fix: Background to the Conservation/Fishing Community Joint Agreement to Recommend
Amendments to the MMPA 12-14 (Sept. 22, 1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal).
56. See O'HARA ETAL., supra note 55 at 181-82. Ten countries held five-year general
permits for U.S. waters, allowing them to take thousands of porpoises, dolphins, whales,
seals, and sea lions. No formal proceedings were held on any, except the Japanese salmon
driftnet application. In addition, two U.S. umbrella organizations representing hundreds
of fishing vessels on the West Coast and North Pacific applied for and received general
permits allowing takes of 6,425 marine mammals. Id. at 174, 181-82.
57. See Bricklemeyer & Iudicello, supra note 55, at 14.
58. Id. at 3-8.
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the Marine Mammal Commission (MMC), after several attempts to
require more complete general permit applications, to advise NMFS that
it would no longer review these requests or make the MMPA findings
required under section 101(a)(1)(B). 9 As the MMC explained, until such
information is provided, there simply was an insufficient basis upon which
to make the findings required to support the issuance of a general
permit. °
After years of allowing general permits to be issued without rigorous
review or adequate information, it became apparent in the late 1980s that
little was known about how fisheries were affecting marine mammals.
61
In January 1988, NMFS announced its intention to prepare an Environ-
mental Impact Statement on the proposed reissuance of domestic general
permits that authorized commercial fishers, primarily in West Coast
waters, to take marine mammals incidental to commercial fishing opera-
tions.62 In preparing the draft EIS, NMFS determined that it had insuffi-
cient information to determine whether most of the marine mammal stocks
that interacted with commercial fishing were within their OSP, and that
collecting the necessary data to determine OSP would require many years
and the commitment of large resources.63
The significance of this problem became clear after the Kokechik
decision and when the lack of adequate information on affected marine
mammal species made it unlikely that any general permits could meet the
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(1) (1994) (requiring that, before permits are issued, NMFS
must consult with the MMC, which must make recommendations as to whether the taking
is consistent with the purposes and policies of the Act). See also MARNE MAMMAL
CoMMIssIoN, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (1986) (letter from Marine Mammal
Commission to National Marine Fisheries Service, July 1, 1985).
60. MARINE MAMMAL COMMIssION, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGREss (1989).
61. Bricklemyer & Iudicello, supra note 55, at 2-3. Arguing that the result of lax
application of the general permit requirement over the period from 1974, when the two-year
moratorium exemption for commercial fisheries expired, to 1988, when Congress amended
the MMPA to require the development of a comprehensive incidental take program, has
been the emergence of a tremendous data gap. As of 1988, far too little information was
available to allow for meaningful application of the general permit requirement. Which
populations were affected by which fisheries and to what extent was generally not known.
Even when such information was available, not enough was known about marine mammal
population size, discreetness, and take levels to provide the basis for effective management
and protection. Id
62. 53 Fed. Reg. 2069 (1988). The existing general permits and two small take
exemptions were scheduled to expire on December 31, 1988.
63. Id
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MMPA's "disadvantage" test.6 Without the OSP determinations, NMFS
could not make the findings required to waive the MMPA moratorium and
promulgate regulations authorizing the incidental take of marine mam-
mals. The implication of this interpretation of the MMPA and the
Kokechik decision was to render "de facto depleted" status for all marine
mammals for which population determinations have not been made.65
F Analysis of 1988 Amendments-
Negotiations Leading to 1988 Amendments
The Kokechik decision brought together representatives of the environ-
mental community and the fishing industry during the spring and summer
of 1988 to find a way to allow fishing to continue and minimize the harm
it caused marine mammals, while gathering the necessary information to
fulfill the purposes of the MMPA. 6 Most of the participating fishing
groups were Alaskan fishing associations concerned about the implications
of takes of Stellers sea lions and Northern fur seals by the salmon,
groundfish, and other fisheries in the Gulf of Alaska, Bering Sea, Bristol
Bay, and Prince William Sound.67 A cross section of environmental
groups also attended the talks.68
During the spring and summer of 1988, the groups met several times
without a facilitator, although each side appointed a principal negotiator
to speak and represent joint views.69 Much of the process was conducted
64. See supra Part II.D and accompanying notes.
65. H.R. REP. No. 100-970, at 17-19 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154,
6157.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. These groups consisted of the following: American Cetacean Society, American
Humane Association, Animal Protection Institute, Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of the Sea
Otter, Greenpeace, The Humane Society of the United States, International Wildlife
Coalition, National Audubon Society, Northwind Undersea Institute, Oceanic Society, Sierra
Club, Society for Animal Protective Legislation, Whale Center, World Wildlife Fund.
Memorandum from Suzanne ludicello, Center for Environmental Education, to James
Douglas, Acting Deputy Administrator for Fisheries, NMFS (Apr. 5, 1988) (on file with the
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal).
69. The fishing industry was represented by Dr. Dayton Lee Alverson of Natural
Resource Consultants, Terry Wright of the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commissions and
Guy Thornburgh of the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission; the environmental
community spokesmen were George Mannina of O'Connor and Hannan retained by the
Center for Marine Conservation, Bo Bricklemeyer of Greenpeace, and Michael Bean of the
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through frequent caucusing; exchange of written proposals; and subse-
quent comment, discussion, and revision.0 The major issues involved
the lack of information concerning marine mammal populations, the
frequency of interactions between marine mammals and fishing opera-
tions, and, the level of takes associated with certain fishing gear.' Both
sides were critical of NMFS, and the agency was not invited to participate
in the discussions.'
G. The Negotiated Proposal and Interim Exemption Program
By June 1988, twenty-five environmental organizations and seventeen
commercial fishing organizations had agreed to a proposed five-year
regime that they presented as a joint proposal to the Senate Commerce
Committee and the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. 73
The proposal outlined suggestions for a program to maintain protection for
marine mammals while allowing continued commercial fishing
operations.74 The goal of the proposal was to provide for improved
collection, reporting, and analysis of information to assess and reduce
interactions between marine mammals and fishing gear.75 Principal
elements of the agreement included:
(1) Exemption for fishermen. The proposal called for a limited
exemption for a three-year period from the permit requirements of
the MMPA for domestic fisheries which had a continuing, docu-
mented interaction with specified marine mammals and which did not
qualify for either a small take exception or a general permit.76
(2) Assessment of fishery-marine mammal interactions. The agree-
ment also called for improved information regarding incidental take
Environmental Defense Fund.
70. Personal observations of the author compiled during the negotiations.
71. H.R. REP. No. 100-970, at 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154.
72. Steven Swartz & Suzanne Iudicello, Testimony on Incidental Take Permits in
Commercial Fisheries Under the MMPA, for the National Ocean Policy Study Committee
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation, May 19, 1966, at 7-11
(on file with Ocean and Coastal Law Journal).
73. S.REP.No. 100-592, at 5-6 (1988).
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id.
76. H.R. REP. No. 100-970, at 19 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154, 6160.
See also S. REP. No. 100-592, at 5-6 (1988).
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of marine mammals, an industry-wide education program, an
observer program for specified fisheries that included a verification
system through limited observer placement, . . monitoring and
reporting requirements, and a centralized non-federal data manage-
ment and analysis system."
(3) Conservation measures. Procedures would be established to
implement emergency protection measures for marine mammals,
develop recovery plans, establish habitat protection zones, and
implement mitigation measures for the program as a whole. In
addition, the proposal called for a research program focused on
specific problems and modifying the population status review process
for marine mammals to establish a timetable and facilitate participa-
tion by fishers, environmentalists, and State resource managers.7"
In November 1988, President Bush signed into law the MMPA Amend-
ments of 1988 establishing an information gathering program and an
Interim Exemption Program for Commercial Fisheries.79 The 1988
Amendments to the MMPA included a five-year program exempting
commercial fisheries from the incidental taking prohibitions of the Act. 0
This limited exemption allowed incidental takes of marine mammals in
fishing gear ranging from coastal gillnets in New England to massive
trawls in the Bering Sea, which included interactions between thirty-eight
different fisheries and forty species of marine mammals (except those in
the eastern tropical Pacific yellowfm tuna purse seine fishery and Califor-
nia sea otters).8 The exemption was designed to allow commercial
fishing to continue while NMFS increased its data gathering, observations,
77. H.R. REP. No. 100-970, at 19 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154, 6160.
78. Id.
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a(1994).
80. Id. § 1383(a)(1). The amendments prescribed that from November 28, 1988 to
October 1, 1993, section 114 of the MMPA rather than sections 101, 103, and 104 of the
MMPA, governed the incidental taking of marine mammals by commercial fishermen other
than tuna fishermen. The exemption was only available to domestic fishermen or foreign
fishermen with valid permits issued under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act; all other foreign fisheries, such as the Japanese high seas salmon fishery,
were not exempted. H.R. REP. No. 100-970, at 21 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6154, 6161.
81. Reauthorization of the Marine Mammal Protection Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Env 't and Natural Resources of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Comm., 103rd Cong. (1993) (statement of Suzanne ludicello, Counsel for the Center for
Marine Conservation).
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and research on marine mammal/fishing interactions, and completed
conservation and recovery plans. 2
The commercial fishing industry was to participate in the data-gathering
program by carrying mandatory on-board observers, compiling log books,
and reporting marine mammal interactions in return for the temporary
exemption from incidental take regulations.8 3  The MMPA Interim
Exemption Program (Interim Exemption) allowed the incidental take of all
marine mammals, except California sea otters, but did not allow the
"intentional lethal taking of Steller sea lions, cetaceans, or any marine
mammal from a stock designated as depleted.""
Under the Interim Exemption for commercial fisheries, operations were
placed in one of three categories based on the fisheries' likelihood to
incidentally take marine mammals.8 5 For each of the three categories,86
NMFS was required to publish an annual list of fisheries, along with the
marine mammals and number of vessels or persons involved in each
fishery.8
7
All vessels in Category I and II fisheries were required to register, pay
a fee, and obtain an Exemption Certificate from NMFS.88 NMFS then
issued each vessel owner an exemption certificate, a fishing logbook, 9 and
a decal to display visibly on the vessel. 9'
The 1988 Amendments required each vessel in these fisheries to
compile information regarding incidental takings of marine mammals and
to acquire data on marine mammal commercial fisheries interactions. 91
82. U.S. DEP'TOF COMMERCE, PROPOSED REGIMETO GOVERN INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
MARINE MAMMALS AND COMMERCIAL FISHING OPERATIONS, DRAFT LEGISLATIVE
ENvIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT. 1.3.3 at 1-4. (1991) [hereinafter DLEIS].
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a (1994).
84. Id. § 1383a(b)(2)(C).
85. Id. § 1383a(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 1383a(b)(1)(B),(C).
88. Id. § 1383a(b)(2)(A). See also 54 Fed. Reg. 21,918 (1989) (stating that category
III fisheries are not required to register with NMFS, but are required to report all lethal
incidental take of marine mammals, make all reasonable efforts to release animals unharmed,
and use all practicable non-injurious methods before any lethal intentional take of a marine
mammal to protect gear, catch, or lives in accordance with these regulations).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a(b), (c) (1994).
90. Id § 1383a(b)(3)(A)(ii). Alternatively, the decal could be in the possession of the
master of the vessel. Id.
91. Id. § 1383a(c).
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Category I and II fisheries were required92 to submit incidental takings
report logs to NMFS at the close of the fishing season or as prescribed by
the Secretary.' Upon receipt of the prior year's logbooks, NMFS would
reissue an exemption certificate and an annual decal. 94
The 1988 Amendments additionally required NMFS to place observers
on Category I vessels to monitor between twenty and thirty-five percent
of the fishing operations by vessels in the fishery.95 The purpose of this
observer program was to obtain statistically reliable information on the
species and number of marine mammals incidentally taken in a fishery and
to verify the accuracy of vessel logs.96 Although observers were not
required on Category II vessels, the 1988 Amendments gave the Secretary
authority to place them in any fishery with the vessel owner's consent.'
The 1988 Amendments also called for establishment of alternative
observation programs where, for reasons of vessel size or safety, onboard
observers were not practicable.98
Congress directed NMFS to promulgate regulations implementing the
program99 and inform the industry about the exemption. " Congress
noted that "representatives of commercial fishing organizations have
agreed to undertake and fund ... an educational effort to inform fisher-
men of their rights and responsibilities under the MMPA. 1'°
H. Analysis of the Implementation of the MMEP
The Interim Exemption was to scheduled to begin in the 1989 fishing
season with the creation by NMFS of the Marine Mammal Exemption
Program (MMEP).102 Administrative delays and the slowness of develop-
ing a mechanism to register vessels and enter data received from fishers
resulted in the publication of categories of fisheries in April 1989, too late
92. Id.
93. 54 Fed. Reg. 21,910, at 21,917 (1989).
94. Id.
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a(e)(1) (1994).
96. Id. See also Interim Exemption for Commercial Fisheries, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,910
(1989).
97. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a(e)(3) (1994).
98. Id. § 1383a(f).
99. Id. § 1383a(k).
100. Id. § 1383a(b)(5)(B).
101. H.R. REP. No. 100-970, at21 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154, 6162.
102. Interim Exemption for Commercial Fisheries, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,910 (1989).
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for that year's fishing season. °3 The first registrations occurred in time
for the 1990 fishing season."°4
The MMEP undertook its task with some problems built in from the
start.105 First, the program was based on a negotiated agreement that
NMFS was not a party to, which often made implementation challeng-
ing. Second, the way in which fishing is conducted in the United States
generally does not lend itself to statistically accurate oversight, a key
element in management. 7 As a result, NMFS could never get a clear
picture of the first element upon which the MMEP revolved: how many
vessels are fishing in a given fishery?"0 8
NMFS attempted to use landing data to determine the number of vessels
in a particular fishery, but the nature of the "universe" for many fisheries
was never determined." Additionally, there were vessels that never
registered and were unaccounted for in the estimated number of vessels
in a fishery as well as vessels that registered that never reported. 1°
Another issue that exacerbated the problem of determining the number of
fishing vessels in a fishery was the lack of a uniform standard for deter-
mining total fishery effort in the MMEP."'
103. Notice of Final List of Fisheries, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,072-86 (1989).
104. Interim Exemption for Commercial Fisheries, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,910, at 21,911
(1989).
105. NINA M. YOUNG Er AL., CENTER FOR MARINE CONSERvATION, THE INcIDENTAL
CAPTURE OF MARINE MAMMALS IN U.S. FISHERiES, PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 13 (Rose
Bierce & Shari Evans eds., 1993).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 14.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 14-25. In 1990, 18,820 vessels registered for the program, and 13,099
submitted reports at the end of the season. Overall percentage of those reporting averaged
64 percent of those registering. However, the participation varied from fishery to fishery
from as low as 1 percent of the vessels in the Washington Coastal River Set Gillnet Fishery
to 100 percent in the California Klamath River Salmon Gillnet Fishery. In 1991, NMFS
monitored 39 fisheries, with 13,756 vessels registered for the program, and 10,487
submitting reports. Overall percentage of those reporting averaged 72 percent of those
registered. However, the participation varied from fishery to fishery from as low as 15
percent of the vessels in the Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic Foreign Joint Venture
Mackerel Trawl Fishery to 100 percent in the California Klamath River Salmon Gillnet
Fishery, Alaska Prince William Sound Set Gilinet Fishery, and the Washington and Oregon
Salmon Net Pen Fishery. Id.
111. YOUNGETAL.,supra note 105, at 15.
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This initial inaccuracy over the numbers of vessels was then com-
pounded because not all vessels registered, not all those registering
reported, marine mammals were misidentified, and logbook entries were
not accurately recorded. I" Self-reporting by vessel captains was criticized
by NMFS, environmental groups, and the fishing industry itself," 3 even
though it was a major component of the MMEP. 4 Logbooks were an
inaccurate source of information " 5 because marine mammals were often
not identified to species, or were misidentified, and takes were under-
reported. " 6
Another criticism of the MMEP was its lack of current information." 7
Agency verification, data entry, receipt of logbooks from captains, receipt
and analysis of observer data, all fell far beyond expected schedules."'
These delays and the data gaps had a number of consequences. It was
difficult for NMFS to correct any perceived errors with the vessel
owner." 9 This caused NMFS to reclassify fisheries based on an incom-
plete picture of marine mammal incidental take2 . and prevented NMFS
from conducting trend analysis on effort, registration, and reported marine
mammal takes.'
To correct some of the inherent problems22 with self-reporting, the
1988 Amendments called for a twenty-five to thirty-five percent level of
observer coverage.2 3 In the five years the exemption program was in
effect, the actual observer coverage ranged from one to ten percent.'24
112. Id. at 14-24.
113. Id. at 25.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 166. Reports from observers indicate that the data generated by fishery
participants are likely to significantly underestimate mortality levels. For example, the
estimated total lethal mammal take in the Gulf of Maine sink gillnet fishery for 1990 alone
based on observer reports (3,013) was nearly twelve times greater than the 259 deaths
reported by logbook participants in that fishery. In 1991, observers reported 1,929 marine
mammals killed while logbooks tallied only 206. Id.
116. YOUNG ET AL., supra note 105, at 25-27.
117. Id. at32.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Interim Exemption for Commercial Fisheries, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,910, 21,919 (1989).
123. Id.
124. YOUNG ET AL., supra note 105, at 28 (noting that observers have monitored eleven
fisheries. In 1990 and 1991, 73 percent and 54 percent, respectively, of the Category I
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The result was an underestimate of marine mammal interaction, injury,
and mortality, and an overall inability to estimate accurately the level of
MMEP participation by the fishery.' Thus, NMFS had no idea what
proportion of total fishing effort the logbooks represented, nor an accurate
estimate of effort for the various fisheries. 1
26
Although the MMEP was not nearly as successful as had been hoped in
generating data, it began to define the magnitude, frequency, nature, and
effects of marine mammal interactions and incidental take in fishery
operations. "Based on observer reports... and vessel owner logbooks
... 8,672 and 6,199 marine mammals were killed in commercial fisheries
in 1990 and 1991 respectively." 27 Vessel owner logbooks (no observer
reports) also reported that 76,473 and 51,678 marine mammals were
harassed during 1990 and 1991.128
In summary, the MMEP provided a broad overview of incidental take
sufficient to identify the specific marine mammal stocks for which
incidental take was a problem, and the commercial fisheries that contrib-
uted to the problem. The MMEP also revealed some of the flaws in the
exemption program. For example, the pitfalls associated with implement-
ing and enforcing a universal registration and reporting requirement, and
the questionable nature of self-reported data from vessel logs. Finally, the
MMEP demonstrated that targeted management and enforcement efforts,
industry endorsement and participation, and education are critical to the
success of any regulatory regime. Although the MMEP had its difficul-
ties, it accomplished what it was supposed to do-gather information on the
extent of marine mammal fisheries interactions and identify mechanisms
to reduce them.
111. 1994 AMENDMENTS
A. MMC Comments and Recommendations
In addition to enacting the exemption in 1988, Congress directed the
MMC to develop a regime that would replace the exemption provision
fisheries had a percent observer coverage less than the 20 percent).
125. Id at 13-14.
126. Id. at 14, 16.
127. Id at 37.
128. Id.
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after its scheduled expiration on October 1, 1993.129 Congress stated that
the suggested regime should include:
(A) [T]he scientific guidelines to be used in determining permissible
levels of incidental taking; 3'
(B) a description of the arrangements for consultation and coopera-
tion with other Federal agencies, the appropriate Regional Fishery
Management Councils and States, the commercial fishing industry,
and conservation organizations; I and,
(C) a summary of such regulations and legislation as would be
necessary to implement the suggested regime.'32
As directed by Congress,' 33 on July 12, 1990, the MMC issued initial
guidelines to NMFS to govern the incidental take of marine mammals
after 1993.134 The MMC recommended that the basic regulatory frame-
work and MMPA goals be retained. 135
129. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a()() (1994).
130. Id. § 1383a(l)(3)(A).
131. Id. § 1383a(/(3)(B).
132. Id. § 1383a()(3)(C).
133. Id. § 1383a(0(1).
135. MARINE MAMMAL CoMMissioN, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 95
(1991).
135. See id. at 96. The MMC specifically reaffirmed the MMPA's zero mortality and
serious injury rate goal for commercial fishing, and recommended that NMFS reinstate the
substantive requirements of the general permit and small-take provisions of the MMPA and
allow the incidental take of marine mammals listed as depleted under the MMPA when: (a)
recovery or conservation plan and implementation of the plan is in place; (b) the level of
take is consistent with the plan and will not contribute to further decline or delay the amount
of time for the population to recover by more than 10 percent; (c) there is an adequate
monitoring and enforcement of the authorized levels of take; and (d) the take will be reduced
to levels as close to zero as practicable. The MMC recommended that NMFS authorize for
three to five years, on an experimental basis, the incidental take from marine mammal stocks
of unknown status when (1) the take would have a negligible effect on the population size
and productivity; and (2) when assessment, monitoring, and enforcement programs are
adequate to ensure authorized take levels are not exceeded, NMFS would determine the
status of the stocks within that time-frame, and identify methods to reduce the take. Other
recommendations included streamlining and continuing vessel registration and reporting
initiated under the MMvIEP; granting explicit authority to the Secretary of Commerce to place
observers onboard any commercial fishing vessel operating in U.S. waters; providing
necessary funding to authorize collection of user fees sufficient for observer and monitoring
programs; considering the impact of takes by fisheries alone and in combination with other
forms of taking and human-caused habitat degradation when setting take levels; and
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B. DLEIS and Scoping Meetings
NMFS announced on May 10, 1990 that it would prepare a detailed
proposal, as well as a Draft Legislative Environmental Impact Statement
(DLEIS). 3 6 The purpose of the DLEIS would be to provide a thorough
analysis of the potential environmental and economic impacts associated
with implementing the long-range plan. '37 The DLEIS would compare
four management options: the MMPA prior to the 1988 Amendments;
the Interim Exemption; the Marine Mammal Commission Guidelines;
and the NMFS Proposal, or long-range plan.13
The major issues that NMFS presented in a scoping issues paper were:
scientific determinations (OSP determinations, stock definition, allowable
mortality, treatment of depleted species, etc.); process (registration,
permits, allocation of take, fishery categories, user fees, etc.); and
monitoring (stock and take monitoring, reporting, observers, etc).
NMFS held public scoping meetings from May 1990 through February
1991,140 proposing a framework built around scientific guidelines for
taking, including allowable takes of depleted and endangered species. A
detailed proposal, as well as the Draft Legislative Environmental Impact
Statement, were released on May 24, 1991.141
The NMFS proposal reaffirmed the goals and objectives of the MMPA,
including goals to maintain or restore marine mammal stocks to their OSP
levels and reduce incidental kill and serious injury of marine mammals to
insignificant levels approaching a zero rate." The NMFS proposal was
designed to: (1) reduce incidental mortality and serious injury of marine
mammals to insignificant levels with minimum hardship to fisheries
involved; (2) establish conservative total allowable biological removal
(ABR) levels for each marine mammal stock, such that the stock could
requiring NMFS to conduct workshops to determine data requirements for making status of
stocks findings and identifying methods for evaluating indirect effects of fisheries on marine
mammals. Id. See also DLEIS, supra note 82, § 1.4.1, at 1-2 to 1-26.
136. DLEIS, supra note 83, § 1.4.2, at 1-26.
137. Id § 2.0 - 2.1, at 2-0 to 2-14.
138. Id. § 2.0-2.1, at 2-1 to 2-2.
139. Id § 1.4.2 at 1-26.
140. ld
141. Id § 1.1, at 1-1 (citing a preliminary draft published in the Federal Register on May
24, 1991). See also MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
87-90 (1992) (giving a detailed summary and analysis of this draft proposed regime).
142. DLEIS, supra note 82, at E-4.
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reach an equilibrium within its OSP level; (3) establish ABR levels so that
limited takings from stocks of uncertain status would not pose significant
risk to these stocks; (4) allow incidental mortalities from stocks that are
depleted, consistent with conservation plans; (5) allocate ABRs among
user groups and fisheries, and create regional quota boards to establish
fishery quotas; (6) monitor incidental takes and compliance with estab-
lished quotas, and charge fishers an administrative fee to recover monitor-
ing costs; (7) take actions such as stopping fishing operations to prevent
quotas from being exceeded; and (8) provide for long-term monitoring
marine mammal stocks to provide the missing OSP data over time.'43
NMFS received comments from eighty-four entities during the public
comment period on various components of its proposal."4 The comment-
ers included numerous federal and state agencies, national and regional
commercial fishing and environmental organizations, research and public
display organizations, and many individuals. 45 NMFS also solicited
feedback at several consultation meetings held in various coastal areas. 146
Although NMFS received comments on all aspects of the initial proposal,
most commenters reflected concerns "about the complexity of the proposal
and its application to a broad range of fisheries rather than focusing on
those with significant incidental takes of marine mammals."'47 Some
commenters were specifically concerned that the term "allowable biologi-
cal removal" implied that the entire calculated ABR would be allocated to
user groups. 148 In addition, there was general concern about the establish-
ment of regional quota boards for allocating ABRs. 1" Finally, a number
of commenters were concerned that the proposed recovery factors were
unnecessarily conservative.'
143. Id. § 2.0 at 2-12 to 2-74.
144. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PROPOSED REGIME TO GOvERN
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN MARINE MAMMALS AND CoMMERcIAL FISHING OPERATIONS (Nov.
1992) [hereinafter PROPOSED REGIME].
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at v.
148. Id. at v-vi.
149. Id. at v-vi.
150. Id. at vii-viii.
1997] Blueprint for Whale Conservation: Implementing the MMPA 171
C. The Interim Proposal
After reviewing the comments and consulting with the Regional Fishery
Management Councils,"' scientific experts, the environmental community,
and the fishing industry, NMFS revised its proposal and issued a Revised
Draft Interim Proposal on November 20, 1991.152 The revised proposal
contained a number of significant changes. First, "the proposal focuses
research, monitoring, and management efforts on the fisheries responsible
for the most significant removals of marine mammal stocks" and fisheries
in which endangered, threatened, or depleted stocks are taken. 53 Second,
the term "allowable biological removal" was changed to "potential
biological removal" (PBR) to indicate that it was a measure of how many
takes a population could withstand, not necessarily the number of takes
that would be authorized by NMFS.'54 Third, the concept of regional
quota boards was abandoned; PBR allocations would be made based on
recommendations made by Regional Fishery Management Councils and
state fishery agencies after public comment.155 Finally, recovery factors
for estimating maximum removals from various population levels were
reduced, unless a higher factor was specified in a recovery or conserva-
tion plan. 5 6
D. NMFS Final Proposed Regime
Following two comment periods, workshops, and ongoing consultations
with affected parties, NMFS delivered its proposed new regime (Proposed
Regime) to Congress in November 1992.111 The Proposed Regime
retained as its cornerstone the MMPA's goal of maintaining marine
mammal stocks within their OSP level while allowing the incidental take
in commercial fisheries when such take would not interfere with marine
151. Regional Fishery Management Councils are created by § 1852 of the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1994). There are eight
regional councils, which prepare fishery management plans for fisheries within their
respective zones. Id. § 1852(h).
152. 56 Fed. Reg. 61,231 (1991).
153. PRoPOsED REGIME, supra note 144, at 2.
154. ME at vi.
155. Id. at 56-67.
156. Id. at 20-26.
157. Id. at i.
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mammal stocks meeting that goal.'58 Additionally, it reaffirmed and
incorporated some basic objectives of the MMPA, such as prohibiting the
taking of marine mammals except under a permit/authorization and
keeping the zero mortality and serious injury rate goal.1 59 Further, the
Proposed Regime would amend the MMPA to allow incidental takes from
threatened, endangered, and depleted species, and marine mammal stocks
of unknown status, all of which were prohibited by the MMPA prior to
the 1988 Amendments. 60
The Proposed Regime applied to all commercial fishing under U.S.
jurisdiction (except eastern tropical Pacific yellowfin tuna fishery); it
affected marine mammal stocks that interact with fisheries; and it replaced
the general permit and small take provisions of the pre-1988 MMPA.161
The Proposed Regime stated that wherever possible NMFS would make
OSP determinations. 62 However, NMFS proposed a fundamental change
in the way OSP would be determined, using current carrying capacity
rather than historic carrying capacity to determine OSP.163 Moreover, the
method used to determine the PBR level resulted in authorizing takes
without precise data and regardless of status of stock while allowing
158. Id. at iii.
159. Id. The Proposed Regime applied the Zero Mortality Rate Goal to all fisheries by
implementing a monitoring program, performance standards, educational programs, and
research into alternative gear and fishing practices. The Proposed Regime recommended
identifying high rates of interactions and determining whether such interactions are
correlated to particular areas, times, or seasons; and implementing mechanisms to "ratchet
down" PBR, and coordinated solutions to reduce mortality and serious injury. Id. at 50-52.
160. Id. at iii.
161. Id. at ix. See also Sauer, supra note 15 (giving a more detailed discussion of (1)
allocating quotas for incidental take to commercial fisheries; (2) allowing the removal of
depleted, endangered, and threatened species; and (3) retaining the zero mortality rate goal
as it relates to the proposed regime and the history and goals of the MMPA).
162. PROPOSED REGIME, supra note 144, at 10.
163. Id. at 11. Carrying capacity (K) is the upper limit of OSP, and refers to an
equilibrium population level before impact by man, either direct or indirect. Typically, K
has been determined based on historic carrying capacity derived by a back calculation
method that requires birth and natural mortality rates, recruitment rate, and direct or indirect
human-related mortality estimates to project the population backwards in time. Id at 2-16;
see also Tim Gerrodette & Douglas P. DeMaster, Quantitative Determination of Optimum
Sustainable Population Level, in MARINE MAMMAL SCIENCE, 6(1), 1, (1990). NMFS
proposed using current carrying capacity absent human exploitation, and factoring in habitat
degradation. PROPOSED REGIME, supra note 144, at 2-24 to 2-25.
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marine mammal stocks to equilibrate to OSP.' " Once PBR was calculated,
NMFS proposed allocating PBRs annually among user groups.1 61
Prior to 1988 the MMPA prohibited takes of depleted marine mammal
stocks incidental to commercial fishing. 66 The Proposed Regime would
have allowed some incidental taking of threatened, endangered, and
depleted marine mammals to be regulated through a small take application
process.6 7 Although NMFS could authorize such takes under the Endan-
gered Species Act with the proposed change,168 takes would only be
permitted if NMFS could determine that the total incidental take would
have a negligible impact on the marine mammal species or stock, and
would not further disadvantage the stock or significantly delay recovery
164. PROPOSED REGmIE, supra note 144, at 11, 28-36. The PBR value is the maximum
number of marine mammals that can be removed (killed or injured) from a stock by all
forms of take while still ensuring the recovery of the stocks. Id. Potential Biological
Removal level is calculated by: (N~in) (R., 1) (F,) where Nmi, is the minimum stuck
abundance, Rm,p, is the rate of increase at the maximum net productivity level, and F, is a
recovery factor. Default values for unknown R.P1 are six percent for pinnipeds and sea
otters and two percent for cetaceans and manatees. F, are 1.0 for stocks at OSP, 0.5 for
depleted and threatened stocks and stocks of unknown status, and 0.1 for endangered stocks.
Recovery factors are in relation to current carrying capacity. The PBR value is the
maximum number of marine mammals that can be removed (killed or injured) from a stock
by all forms of take while still ensuring the recovery of the stock. Id. at 2-22 to 2-23.
165. Id. at 56-73. In the proposed allocation process, NMFS would publish annually a
list of stocks and estimated total take by user groups, the PBR calculation for each stock, and
the classification of stocks and fisheries. The two marine mammal stock classifications,
alpha and beta, were based on the level of take or the stock status: depleted, threatened, or
endangered. Fisheries were classified as either Category 1, II, or III based on which stock
they interacted with and the level of interaction. NMFS would then propose a PBR
allocation for all fisheries interacting with alpha stocks to fisheries management councils and
states to review, to allow for hearings, and to make recommendations to NMFS for
allocations on a fishery by fishery basis. Once NMFS received the recommendations, they
would then publish the final notice of allocations for all user groups and maintain a reserve
of PBR for contingencies. The PBR for beta stocks would not be allocated. Id.
166. 16 U.S.C. §1371(a)(3)(B) (1994).
167. PROPOSED REGrmE, supra note 144, at 55.
168. Id
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time.'69 Further, NMFS proposed to allow intentional takes (lethal and
non-lethal) of endangered and threatened species.'7
The Proposed Regime included a monitoring program that included on-
board observers, remote platform observers, vessel logbooks and indirect
indices (e.g. stranding records).' 7' Also included was a registration
system that required each vessel in a fishery interacting with marine
mammal stocks to register and receive an authorization to fish, 72 and
mechanisms to enforce the allocations.173
E. Summary Analysis of the Proposed Regime
NMFS once again received a number of comments, and held numerous
meetings with fishing industry and environmental groups to explain the
revisions and to more directly gauge the responses to them. The final
proposal addressed each of these issues. The scheme for classifying
fisheries was revised to focus even more precisely on fisheries in which
endangered, threatened, or depleted stocks are taken. The final proposal
increased the level of protection afforded marine mammal stocks by
providing for the more conservative recovery factors included in the
original proposal. Finally, NMFS maintained the MMPA prohibition on
taking marine mammals without authorization by requiring vessel owners
to apply for and obtain an authorization to take marine mammals through
the proposed registration process. To deal with "inconsistencies" between
the Endangered Species Act and MMPA, NMFS proposed that the
MMPA be amended to allow the taking of endangered and threatened
marine mammals incidental to commercial fishing operations under the
provisions of section 101(a)(5), and authorized under the ESA.174
169. Id. at 55-57 (NMFS proposed calculating PBRs for depleted, threatened, and
endangered stocks using conservative recovery factors and adjusting the PBR further based
on information in the Stock Assessment Report, existing conservation/recovery plans, or
other sources. In some cases that adjustment could mean that NMFS would not permit
removals from a particular population (e.g. right whales)).
170. Id. at 56.
171. Id. at 80-90.
172. Id. at 71-73. (Prior to the 1988 Amendments, the MMPA prohibited unauthorized
incidental takes of marine mammals, but individual fishermen or vessels did not need an
authorization under the MMPA to participate in commercial fisheries).
173. PROPOSED REGIME, supra note 144, at 51-52.
174. Id. at 2-45 to 2-48.
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The fishing industry remained concerned that fisheries with insignificant
incidental takes were still being included within the management
scheme. 75 The environmental community thought that the interim pro-
posal continued to under-protect marine mammals; specifically by: (1)
reducing the conservatism provided by the originally proposed recovery
factors; (2) proposing to use current carrying capacity to determine OSP;
and, (3) removing the requirement from the MMPA that fishermen must
apply for takes before being allowed to remove marine mammals. 76
F. Negotiation Process-Rationales and Participants
Reaction to the NMFS proposal from the conservation community and
the fishing industry was mixed. The conservation community questioned
NMFS' ability to enforce removal levels and raised questions regarding
timing and the lack of clear procedural steps for both industry and the
public in the various allocation and stock assessment processes. 177 Conser-
vationists also expressed concerns about the proposal's apparent departure
from the ZMRG of the MMPA. Under the proposed NMFS system, as
marine mammal stocks increased, PBR levels would also increase. 17
Conservationists were similarly troubled by the fact that the Proposed
Regime focused on allocating lethal takes rather than reducing them. 179
Additionally, conservationists felt that research priorities should be
directed, at least in part, to investigating alternative gear or fishing
techniques to mitigate interaction between marine mammals and
fisheries. 80
Commercial fishers also objected to many elements of the proposed
NMFS regime. They were concerned with how PBRs would be calcu-
lated, how marine mammal takes would be allocated among competing
sectors of the industry, and that their quota would be automatically
175. H.R. REP. No. 103-439, at 5 (1994).
176. Id.
177. Governing Interaction Between Marine Mammals and Commercial Fishing and
Commercial Fishing Operations, 1993, Before the Subcomm. on Env't and Natural
Resources of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 15
(1993) (statement of Suzanne Iudicello, Counsel, Center for Marine Conservation and
statement of Dick Gutting, Blue Water Fishermen Ass'n).
178. Id. (statement of Suzanne Iudicello, Counsel, Center for Marine Conservation).
179. Id (statement of Suzanne ludicello, Counsel, Center for Marine Conservation and
statement of Sharon Young, Wildlife Consultant, International Wildlife Coalition).
180. Id
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reduced to account for lethal takes by other users.' 8' The fear of a
quota-based management regime that depended on statistical extrapola-
tions of potential lethal takes throughout all fisheries aggravated these
concerns. 8 ' Alaskan Native groups were concerned about the impacts of
PBR allocations on their subsistence needs.'
In an effort to draft an alternative management regime that would
address these concerns, a coalition of environmental organizations, animal
welfare groups, commercial fishing industry representatives, and Alaskan
Natives began meeting in early 1993, assisted by a professional
facilitator.'84 The first meeting was held in February 1993 to discuss,
generally, the MMPA reauthorization. 8 ' Formal discussions took place
in March and April with the specific goal of developing a management
regime to protect all marine mammal stocks that have a record of, or a
potential for, interacting with commercial fisheries.'86
181. Id. (statement of Dick Gutting, Blue Water Fishermen Ass'n).
182. Id. (statement of Alvin Osterback, Jr. Assembly Member, Aleutians East Borough,
Anchorage, Alaska).
183. H.R. REP. No. 103-439, at 5 (1994).
184. Memorandum from the MMPA Negotiating Group on MMPA Negotiations
Relevant to Commercial Fishing Interactions, to Interested Persons (June 10, 1993) ( on file
with Ocean and Coastal Law Journal) [hereinafter Negotiated Proposal]. The following
groups were members of the coalition: Alaska Groundfish Data Bank, Aleutians East
Borough, American Factory Trawler Association, American High Seas Fisheries
Association, American Seafood Harvesters Association, Animal Protection Institute, Arctic
Alaska Fisheries Corporation/Tyson Seafood Group, Association of Village Council
Presidents, Bering Sea Fishermen Association, Blue Water Fishermen's Association,
California Abalone Association, California Gillnetters Association, California Urchin Divers
Association, California Urchin Producers Association, Center for Marine Conservation,
Concerned Area M, Friends of the Sea Otter, Gulf of Alaska Coalition, Kodiak Island
Borough, Maine Gillnetters Association, Maine Sardine Council, National Audubon Society,
National Fisheries Institute, New England Fishery Management Council, Northwest Indian
Fisheries Commission, Pacific Seafood Processors Association, Pacific States Marine
Fisheries Commission, Peninsula Marketing Association, Point Judith Fisheries Cooperative
Association, Sea Urchin Processors Association of California, Seafreeze LTD, The
Associated Fisheries of Maine, The Marine Mammal Center, The National Fishmeal and Oil
Association, Trout Unlimited, and the World Wildlife Fund. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2.
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G. Role of Keystone as Facilitators
The initial February meeting made it clear that all the groups were
interested in drafting an alternative proposal to what NMFS was going to
present to Congress.'87 The groups had a two-day meeting to hear
presentations from NMFS on the progress of the interim exemption
program' (see results of the reporting system) and hear a briefing on the
agency's proposal.' 9 At that session the groups agreed that ground rules
were necessary for the talks to continue, and that a third-party facilitator
would be helpful to keep the process on track. 90 The groups selected the
Keystone Center to lead the talks.19' The facilitator ensured adherence to
ground rules, set dates and places for meetings, kept the group on
schedule, provided a means to keep the discussions flowing and open to
all participants, collected notes and materials, and circulated drafts of
various elements of the proposals as they emerged from the group. 192 As
the talks progressed to increasingly difficult issues, the facilitator identi-
fied obstacles and assisted the group in reaching several critical break-
throughs. 193
H. Negotiation Process
The group developed criteria that would be used to identify marine
mammal stocks, rank them by criticality, and set priorities for the stocks
which, for a variety of reasons, deserved immediate attention.1 9 The
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Letter from Guy Thornburgh, Executive Director, Pacific States Marine Fisheries
Comm'n, to Herb Kaufman, Office of Protected Species, NMFS (Mar. 3, 1993) (on file with
the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal).
190. Facsimile from Suzanne ludicello, Senior Program Counsel, Center for Marine
Conservation, Request for Proposals to Facilitate (Mar. 20, 1993) (on file with the Ocean
and Coastal Law Journal.)
191. Letter from Abby P. Dilley, Vice President, The Keystone Center, to Suzanne
Judicello, Senior Program Counsel, Center for Marine Conservation (March 29, 1993) (on
file with Authors).
192. Telephone interview with Abby P. Dilly, Vice President, The Keystone Center
(Sept. 16, 1996). See also REsOLvE, CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
WASHINGTON, D.C., MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT REAUTHORIZATION NEGOTIATION
11 (1996) (Pub. No. 27).
193. See telephone interview with Abby P. Dilly, supra note 192.
194. Negotiated Proposal, supra note 184, at 3.
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group agreed that total lethal takes from all sources must be brought below
the biological level at which the mammal population sustains itself,'95 and
that any management regime must be designed to achieve this result as
quickly as possible. 96 There were a number of intentions behind this
proposed management system. The first was to recover stocks to OSP, 97
to be accomplished by expediting reduction in lethal take to insignificant
levels approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate.'98 A second
intent was to take aggressive and quick action to avoid the point at which
the marine mammal must be listed as "threatened" or "endangered" under
the ESA or designated depleted under the MMPA.199 Finally, the group
intended to ensure that fishing interactions do not significantly retard
recovery. 
200
The proposed process focused on incidental mortality of marine
mammals in commercial fishing operations. 20' The group agreed early on
that their talks would not address other pending reauthorization issues
such as public display, scientific research permits, tuna-dolphin interac-
tions, or other issues.20 2 Their Negotiated Proposal was intended to
replace the Interim Exemption Program enacted in the 1988 Amend-
ments.2"3 Although the Negotiated Proposal recognized "instances where
mortality from other sources [had to be] considered or accounted for, the
negotiators did not intend . . . to replace existing MMPA (or other
statutory) regimes for regulating, prohibiting or permitting non-fishing
takes of marine mammals. '" 24  The availability of money for federal
marine mammal programs was a concern of both sides. 05
This concern, combined with the industry's desire to minimize regula-
tory burdens and the conservationists' desire to focus resources, pro-
grams, and management measures on marine mammal species needing the
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 6-7 (1995)
(discussing other aspects of the reauthorization).
203. Negotiated Proposal, supra note 184, at 3.
204. Id. at 194.
205. Id.
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most protection, led the group to seek a priority-setting mechanism. 206
Their Negotiated Proposal created an "immediate focus of management
actions, especially those pertaining to commercial fishing, ... on marine
mammal stocks that [were] in decline or [were] at low population levels
as a result of incidental lethal take by itself or in combination with other
sources of mortality."20 7
The negotiators discussed, but did not address specifically, the issue of
"abundant marine mammal stocks that interact with fishing operations and
that may be at or near OSP."'2°8 They recommended "direct[ing] those
issues to the pre-1988 MMPA process for OSP findings, and rulemaking
under sections 103 and 104 of the Act, which provide for incidental lethal
takes of marine mammals at or above OSP."2°9
L Negotiated Proposal
During the negotiations, "the Conservation Community's basic premise
was that the MMPA imposed, and would continue to impose, a morato-
rium on taking marine mammals, with the goal of reducing incidental
lethal take of marine mammals in commercial fishing operations to
insignificant levels approaching zero mortality and serious injury rate."2"'
On the other hand, commercial fishers "wanted to avoid a burdensome
management regime that applied across-the-board to all fisheries regard-
less of the known, or presumed, level of its impact on[,] or interaction
with[,] marine mammals." 1' Further, the negotiators believed that any
proposal should have "all concerned parties actively involved in the entire
[regulatory and management] process-from the review of the relevant
science to the development of specific management measures. How-
ever, both sides agreed that limited funding would be a key factor in how
much desired scientific and regulatory activity could be undertaken.z3
Therefore, the group started with the working premise that all marine
mammal stocks would be afforded protection, and that research and
206. Id.
207. Id. at 3.
208. Id at4.
209. Id at4.
210. Id at3.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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management priorities would be set based on the status of the marine
mammal stock and level of lethal take.2" 4
The Negotiated Proposal incorporated many of the concepts of NMFS's
proposed regime, including PBR.215 However, NMFS's proposal allo-
cated takes on a fishery-specific basis, while the Negotiated Proposal
emphasized marine mammal stocks.2" 6 The Negotiated Proposal set a
ten-year time frame for attainment of the zero mortality rate goal of the
MMPA. z1l Further, it created new opportunities for participation by
industry, conservation groups and the public in both reviews of the
underlying scientific assumptions of marine mammal management, and on
incidental take teams to work with NMFS to craft methods to reduce
harmful interactions between fisheries and marine mammals."' l The
objectives stated in the negotiated document are:
1. To involve all interested parties early in every aspect of research,
conservation, and management;
2. To reduce immediately the lethal takes of marine mammals from
all sources to a level that allows the recovery of stocks;
3. Within ten years, to reduce incidental mortality rates of marine
mammals caused by commercial fishing to insignificant levels
approaching zero.219
The parties also agreed that fisheries that incidentally lethally take marine
mammals from stocks that were at OSP, had to complete the pre-1988
process of findings, and general permit or small take permit authorizations
of the MMPA.2 °
The Negotiated Proposal called for a "designation of stocks known not
to be at OSP or whose status [was] unknown[, to] be made as part of the
publication of the Secretary's preliminary stock assessment. 12' As part
of the proposed final rules, the Negotiated Proposal recommended a
"general authorization for the taking of marine mammals in the course of
214. Id. at 3.
215. H.R. REP. No. 103-439, at 6 (1994).
216. Id.
217. Negotiated Proposal, supra note 184, at 5.
218. Id. at 9-13.
219. Id. at 4-5.
220. Id. at 5.
221. Id.
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commercial fishing, " ' subject to criteria that incorporated the group's
adherence to a biologically-based priority setting system focusing attention
on marine mammal stocks of the most concern, or "critical" stocks.'
The Negotiated Proposal subjected takes of critical stocks to manage-
ment measures adopted in a conservation plan. 4 It also provided that
takes from non-critical stocks would be subjected to regulation by the
Secretary, and fishers would be required to report all lethal takes.' After
much debate fishers finally agreed that in no case would the general
authorization permit intentional killing of marine mammals. 6  The
Negotiated Proposal recommended authorizing takes of endangered and
threatened marine mammals pursuant to the Endangered Species Act,
rather than under the MMPA, as recommended by the MMC and the
NMFS. 2 27
The proposal set out detailed time tables for publication of stock
assessments, peer review, public review, and Secretarial action to publish
findings and convene conservation teams for critical stocks. 8 The teams'
primary purpose was to review the scientific information for a marine
mammal stock or group of stocks within a region and identify problems
and mitigation measures that could contribute to moving critical stocks to
non-critical status and to develop a conservation plan.229 The teams were
to serve in an advisory capacity to the Secretary and to have as their
immediate task finding a suite of measures that would reduce lethal takes
below the calculated removal level.3 0 Each conservation team was also
to establish interim benchmarks to measure actual performance against the
goal of reducing incidental fishing mortality to an insignificant rate
approaching zero within ten years."3
The Negotiated Proposal called for consideration of a variety of
management measures. The measures ranged from traditional actions
such as fishery-specific lethal take limits, time/area closures, observers
222. Id.
223. Id. at 3-5.
224. Id at 5.
225. IT.
226. Idl
227. MARINE MAMMAL COMMIssION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (1995).
228. Negotiated Proposal, supra note 184, at 9.
229. Id. at 10.
230. Id. at 10-11.
231. Id. at 11.
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and permits, to innovative tools such as incentive programs for fishers,
education, alternative gear techniques, and new technologies. 2
Several of the environmental groups that participated in the negotiations
chose not to sign onto the agreement after the talks concluded. 3 They
expressed concern that the proposal did not contain a central vessel
registry, lacked a mandatory observer program, did not provide for
sufficient funding of research into alternative fishing technologies, and
was without a prohibition on the take of endangered species." These
groups subsequently formed a coalition of fifteen environmental and
animal welfare organizations to advocate more protective measures in the
proposed legislation.235
J. House and Senate Action
The Subcommittee on Environment and Natural Resources of the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee held three hearings on MMPA
reauthorization: on April 20, 1993, to hear reactions to the NMFS
proposed regime; on August 4, 1993 to take testimony on House Bill
2760, introduced in July by Reps. Studds, Young, Fields, Manton, and
Saxton; and again on February 10, 1994, to review provisions on public
display of marine mammals. 6 House Bill 2760 incorporated many of the
suggestions of the Negotiated Proposal, as well as elements from the
NMFS Proposed Regime and issues raised by the MMC and others."
The August 4, 1993 hearing elicited so many diverse views on the
legislation that the Committee concluded that it could not reconcile the
issues in the time remaining before the expiration of the Interim Exemp-
tion Program on October 1, and moved to extend the exemption for
another six months.238 On September 13, 1993, sponsors of House Bill
2760 introduced House Bill 3049, to extend the interim exemption through
232. Id. at 12.
233. H.R. REP. No. 103-439, at 25 (1994).
234. Id. at 26.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 26-27.
237. Id. at 27.
238. Id. See also MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 4 (1995).
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March 31, 1994, and it was enacted and signed into law on September 30,
1994.219
The Senate Commerce Committee held hearings on July 14, 1993 to
consider a new regime to govern incidental take of marine mammals
during commercial fishing operations, and held another hearing on July
28, 1993 to examine the process for obtaining permits for public display
of marine mammals and for scientific research.' On November 8, 1993,
Senators Kerry, Stevens and Packwood introduced Senate Bill 1636, to
reauthorize the MMPA.241 This bill incorporated much of the Negotiated
Proposal, but was modified by comments from the MMC, NMFS, and
from comments during a series of meetings among House and Senate staff
and affected interest groups.242 At a November 9 Committee session, the
bill was amended to allow vessels in Hawaiian waters to approach whales
as close as 100 yards.243 It was also amended to authorize the Secretary
to "remove lethally a nuisance pinniped if the animal was identified as
habitually exhibiting dangerous or damaging behavior that could not be
deterred by other means."2I
The amendment further called for a task force to consult with the
Secretary of Commerce about seals and sea lions considered "nuisance"
animals, because of their predation of steelhead and salmon, species
prized by commercial and recreational fishermen, at the Ballard Locks in
Seattle and in the Columbia River. 5 Proponents argued that the preda-
tion had contributed to declines in several species of fish. 6 On January
239. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a(1994); H.R. REP. No. 103439, at27 (1994).
240. S. REP. No. 103-220, at 5 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 518,
522 (1994). See also NuISANCEANIMAL REPORT, in Memorandum from Suzanne
ludicello, Center for Marine Conservation, to Peigin Barrett et al (June 6, 2993)
(on file with Authors) (a subgroup of the negotiating parties also had met to
address this topic, and had proposed to Congress a multi-phased process that would
have evaluated whether all feasible methods of non-lethal deterrence had been tried
and whether the target marine mammals were responsible for the fish declines).
241. S. REP. No. 103-220, supra note 240, at 5.
242. Meetings with Penny Dalton, Lila Helms, Earl Comstock, and Trevor
McCabe of Senate Commerce Comm. and Karen Steuer and Rod Moore of House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm., Washington, D.C. (August 9 and 10,
1993).
243. Id
244. S. REP. No. 103-220, supra note 240, at 5 (1994).
245. Id
246. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE PROTECTED SPECIES, MARINE
MAMMALS' PREDATION OF VARIETIES OF FISH, REP. TO SLADE GORTON, U.S. SENATE,
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25, 1994, Senate Bill 1636 was reported to the Senate floor for consider-
ation,247 and further discussion of issues including public display and
scientific research continued.248
After a Committee markup on March 16, 1994, House Bill 2760 came
to the floor of the House on March 21, 1994, and passed under suspension
of the rules.24 9 Senate Bill 1636 passed the Senate on the same day."
House and Senate leaders worked to resolve differences between the two
bills." The House amended and passed Senate Bill 1636 on March 22.52
On March 24, the Senate added two more amendments to Senate Bill 1636
as approved by the House, and sent it back to the House. 3
K. Stumbling Blocks to Passage
Although incidental take of marine mammals in commercial fisheries
fueled the momentum behind the reauthorization, several other issues
arose during the reauthorization,254 including changes to permit proce-
dures for public display and scientific research, and two topics that
threatened to derail passage, protection of marine mammal habitat and the
importation of polar bear pelts from Canada. 5 It was these latter two
issues that caused the bill to "bounce" back and forth between the House
and the Senate in March and April.56
As already stated, public display of marine mammals and scientific
research permits merited a separate hearing before the House Subcommit-
tee on February 10, 1994.257 Changes to procedures for these activities
were incorporated as part of a committee substitute to House Bill 2760.58
These changes were adopted in the previously mentioned markup by the
GAO/RCED 93-204, (Sept. 1993).
247. S. REP.No. 103-220, supra note 240, at 5.
248. Id.
249. H.R. REP. No. 103-439, at 28 (1994).
250. 140 CONG. REC. S3619-31, S3630 (daily
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. H.R. REP. No. 103-439, at 27, 28 (1994).
257. MARNE MAMMAL CoMMIssION, 1994 ANN
258. H.R. REP. No. 103-439, at 28 (1994).
ed. Mar. 24, 1994).
FUAL REPORTTO CONGRESS 5-6 (1995).
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Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on March 16, 1994 and
reported to the House floor. 9
The contentious issue outside the incidental take debate focused on a
dispute over lifting the prohibition on import of polar bear trophies from
Canada.2" When the House sent Senate Bill 1636 back to the Senate in
March, it contained language that would allow American hunters to bring
back to the United States the hides of polar bears killed legally in
Canada.26" ' The two houses reached an impasse when Senator John Kerry
indicated his unwillingness to see the ban lifted, and Representative Jack
Fields reported he would oppose any MMPA reauthorization that did not
contain the provision.262 The trophy issue galvanized elements of the
animal welfare community that had either been quiescent on MMPA
reauthorization or had objected to, but acquiesced in, most of the other
elements of the 1994 Amendments.263 The polar bear trophy provisions
elicited threats of filibusters, holds, and other tactics to prevent passage
of MMPA reauthorization. 2I Senator Kerry was able to persuade
Representative Fields to accept additional protections, including a scien-
tific study, to be sure that U.S. trophy hunting was having no effect on the
Canadian polar bear population.265 It was hard selling the notion to the
animal welfare groups. Kerry said, "with this additional polar bear
protection language, I believe that the benefits of the overall MMPA
package vastly outweigh the potential problems associated with the polar
bear provision. If we fail to take action now, we sentence thousands of
marine mammals to death and injury that could be avoided by our new
regime. ' 26
259. Id.
260. MARINE MAMMAL COMMIssION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Appendix
D, 267-68 (1995). See also 140 CONG. REC. H2724-25 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1996) (statement
of Rep. Jack Fields); 140 CONG. REc., S4933 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1994) (statement of Sen.
John Kerry).
261. 140 CONG. REC. S3619-03, S3630 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994).
262, 140 CONG. REc. S3630 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
263. Letter from Donna Hart, Chair, Marine Mammal Protection Coalition to
Representative Gerry Studds (Feb. 22, 1994) (on file with Authors).
264. Views expressed at a meeting which the Authors attended between Senator John
Kerry and members of conservation and animal welfare groups in the Senator's office in
Washington, D.C. on March 23, 1994.
265. 140 CONG. REC. S4933 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1994) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
266. Id.
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Another major disagreement arose within a day of the positive action
in the House and Senate when the House, in an effort to place more
emphasis on protection of marine mammal habitat, upset the property
rights movement in the guise of the timber industry "for reasons which
have nothing to do with marine mammals, nothing to do with
fishermen." '67 Claiming that the approach the House had used to give
additional protection to habitats would affect litigation over "critical
habitat" as that term was used in the Endangered Species Act, timber
interests were successful in finding several Senators to put holds on the
bill.26 This prevented it from coming to the Senate floor. 69
Approaching the April 1, 1994 (extended) expiration date of the Interim
Exemption, House members introduced House Bill 4412 to extend the
exemption for one more month, until May 1, 1994 but made it clear there
would be no further extensions.27 The extension measure was adopted by
both houses and signed into law on March 31, 1994.271 Both houses went
on Easter break leaving sponsors and proponents to work out an agree-
ment on habitat protection.272
Environmental groups called the dispute meddling by elements of the
wise use movement who had no interest at stake in marine mammal
issues.Y "Timber's rhetorical fear-mongering campaign over a definition
has completely stalled the passage of an important conservation law. A
law in which they have no stake."274
The floor manager of the bill in the House, sponsor Gerry Studds,
stated the problem in the following way:
From the beginning of our negotiations on this legislation, one of our
goals has been to provide adequate protection for the important
habitats of marine mammals. Over the past 20 years, one lesson has
been made clear: that we cannot protect the creatures of this world
without protecting their essential habitats. For marine mammals, that
267. 140 CONG. REC. H2724 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1994) (statement of Rep. Studds).
268. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1994 ANmuAL REPORTTO CONGRESS 5 (1995).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. An open letter to House and Senate Conferees on S. 1636, The Marine Mammal
Protection Act Amendments of 1994 (Center for Marine Conservation, Washington, D.C.).
274. Id.
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translates into protecting feeding grounds, rookeries, nursery
grounds, migration paths and the like.
Originally we had amended the definition of "take" in the MMPA to
include "harm'; we then defined "harm" to include destruction of
significant marine mammal habitats. Unfortunately, some special
interest attorneys feared that this change in the MMPA would affect
pending litigation concerning the Endangered Species Act.... [It
became quickly clear that we had to change our strategy to accom-
plish our goal.275
Eventually the two bodies agreed to language276 that clarified the
Secretary's existing authority to protect areas of "special ecological
significance" without affecting any other laws.21 With that settled, the
House and Senate proceeded to voice their approval of the 1994 Amend-
ments to the MMPA on April 26, 1994.
L. Analysis of the 1994Amendments
The 1994 Amendments to the MMPA set out a new regime to govern
incidental takes of marine mammals during commercial fishing operations.
The underlying premise is taken from the NMFS proposal that decisions
on allowable takes should be based on assessments of the status of the
marine mammal stock and the operation of the fisheries, and conducted
within biological limits that protect the marine mammal stocks.28 The
275. CONG. REc. H2724 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1994) (statement of Rep. Studds).
276. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361(5), 1382(e) (1994). See also MARiNE MAMMAL COMMIssION,
1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 265-66 (1995). Provisions in the findings section:
[W]ere amended to strengthen the Act's general policy statements to call for the
protection of essential habitat and to recognize the need to protect and conserve
marine mammal habitat in addition to the animals themselves. A habitat related
amendment was also added to ... authorize the Secretary to develop and implement
conservation and management measures to alleviate impacts on rookeries, mating
grounds, or other areas of similar ecological significance that may be causing the
decline or impeding the recovery. of a strategic stock of marine mammals.
lad
277. 140 CONG. REC. H2724 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1994) (statement of Rep. Studds). See
also 140 CONG. REc. S4934 (daily ed. April. 26, 1994) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
278. See supra Part II.G and accompanying notes; Marine Mammal Protection Act
Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-238, 108 Stat. 544 (1994) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
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major elements, described in detail below, add three new sections to the
MMPA. One requires stock assessments, status determinations, and
calculation of the stock's potential biological removal level. 279 A second
new section, section 118, sets out the requirements for fishermen,
modeled largely after the Interim Exemption.20  A third new section,
section 120, provides a process whereby states and NMFS can address
interactions between pinnipeds and fishery resources. 21' The approach to
incidental takes includes required vessel registration, observer coverage,
emergency regulatory authority, attainment of the zero mortality rate goal,
convening of incidental take reduction teams and preparation of take
reduction plans, and a prohibition on intentional killing of marine mam-
mals by fishers.282
The only change to the underlying policy declarations of the MMPA
was the addition of habitat protection to the findings section of the Act.
The 1994 Amendments call for efforts to protect "essential habitats" from
"the adverse effect of man's actions," and add habitat protection to the list
of necessary activities.283
While the definition of the term "take" in the Act remained unchanged
and still includes "harass" as a form of take, harassment is further defined
as any act of pursuit, torment or annoyance of marine mammals in the
wild. It distinguishes between levels that have the potential to injure and
those that could disrupt behavior patterns.284 Additional new definitions
cover terms and concepts in the new incidental take regime. The new
definitions include "strategic stock," "potential biological removal level,"
"take reduction plan," "take reduction team," "net productivity rate," and
"minimum population estimate." '285
The authorization to take marine mammals under the new incidental
take regime is found in section 101 of the Act,286 which also delineates
the moratorium on taking and exceptions.287 The 1994 Amendments
require the Secretary to authorize incidental takes of marine mammals in
279. 16 U.S.C. § 1386 (1994).
280. Id. § 1387.
281. Id. § 1389.
282. Id.
283. Id. § 1361(2), (5)(B).
284. Id. § 1362(18).
285. 16 U.S.C. § 1362 (19), (20), (24), (25), (26), (27) (1994).
286. Id. § 1387.
287. Id. § 1371.
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the course of commercial fishing operations,"8 subject to regulations, but
in lieu of permits prescribed under the Secretarial findings, waiver, and
regulations procedures set out in section 103.? Also added was language
to describe the procedure for governing takes of marine mammals
designated as depleted because of an endangered or threatened species
listing.2 ° The measure requires a finding by the Secretary that the
incidental mortality and serious injury from the commercial fishing take
will have a negligible impact on the species; that a recovery plan has been
developed under the ESA; and that a monitoring program has been
established. 1 A permit may be granted to an entire fishery, but reporting
is required on a vessel basis.2" The Secretary may amend, modify or
revoke such permits, and if during the course of the fishery the level of
mortality or injury is likely to have more than a negligible impact on the
affected marine mammal stock, the Secretary is directed to employ
emergency measures to protect the stock. 293
For the first time, the Act grants any person the authority to deter
marine mammals damaging private property or endangering personal
safety, as long as the deterrence measures do not cause death or serious
injury to the marine mammal.2 94 The authority fishers received in the
1988 Amendments to deter marine mammals from fishing gear or catch
was modified to apply only to non-lethal actions.295 The 1994 Amend-
ments also called for publication by NMFS of guidelines for deterrence,2 96
and an assessment of forms of deterrence, with authority to prohibit those
that have a significant adverse effect on marine manmals.297
Section 104 of the Act governs the various permits required for taking
or importing marine mammals." Although the new section 118 provides
a mechanism in lieu of permits for takes in the course of commercial
fishing, section 104 retains existing permits for authorizing takes of
288. Id. § 1371(a)(5)(E).
289. Id § 1371(2).
290. Id. § 1387(a)(2).
291. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(E) (1994).
292. Id. § 1371(a)(5)(E)(ii).
293. Id. § 1371(a)(5)(E)(iii),(iv).
294. Id § 1371(a)(4)(A).
295. Id
296. Id. § 1371(a)(4)(B).
297. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(4)(C) (1994).
298. Id. § 1374.
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dolphins in the eastern tropical Pacific (ETP) tuna fishery and for small
take permits for activities other than commercial fishing. 2
Section 110 requires ecosystem studies in the Gulf of Maine and the
Bering Sea."° The Gulf of Maine study assesses human caused factors
affecting the health and stability of the ecosystem. 30' The study includes
a workshop, and recommendations for a research and management
program to foster marine mammal protection, manage the ecosystem,
ensure management options for the future, and permit the use of marine
resources.
30 2
The Bering Sea study requires the Secretary of Commerce to consult
with the Secretary of the Interior, the Marine Mammal Commission, and
the State of Alaska and Alaskan Native organizations to conduct scientific
research on the health and stability of the Bering Sea ecosystem. 30 3 The
program focuses on uncertainties surrounding the population declines of
marine mammals, birds and other living marine resources in the region. 31
Section 112 requires the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with
the Marine Mammal Commission, to take action to alleviate impacts on
strategic stocks by protecting marine mammal habitat.0 5 If a stock
assessment reveals that impacts on rookeries, mating grounds or other
significant habitat areas are causing declines or impeding recovery of a
strategic stock, conservation and management measures are to be devel-
oped and implemented through notice and comment rulemaking. 31
The Interim Exemption for commercial fisheries described in section
114 in the 1988 Amendments was retained until September 1995 to allow
the transition to the new regime governing incidental takes in commercial
fishing.30 7 Section 115 of the Act requires status reviews of marine
mammal stocks and for the preparation and implementation of conserva-
tion plans.308 It also adds new language that any conservation plan
299. Id. § 1374(a).
300. Id. § 1380(c).
301. Id. § 1380(c)(1).
302. Id. § 1380(c)(1)(A)-(D).
303. 16 U.S.C. § 1380(d)(1) (1994).
304. Id.
305. Id. § 1382(e).
306. Id. § 1382(e).
307. Id. § 1383(a)(1).
308. Id. §§ 1386, 1383b.
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prepared under this subsection must incorporate a take reduction plan
required under section 118.1°
The most significant changes to the Act are new sections 117 and 118,
which incorporate the new regime to govern incidental takes of marine
mammals during commercial fishing operations."' Stock Assessments
form the basis for the new regime, and section 117(a) directs the Secretary
to consult with scientific review groups in preparing the assessments.
The assessments, which require public -review and comment, are to
include the best scientific information on affected marine mammal stocks
including range, population estimates, mortality estimates, commercial
fishery interactions, description of the fisheries interacting with the stock,
categorization of the stock, and an estimate of the potential biological
removal for the stocky.3 2 The Secretary is to prepare annual assessments
for strategic stocks and for those for which significant new information is
available, and every three years for other stocks. 3
Section 118 restates the zero mortality rate goal, and sets a seven year
deadline to achieve the goal. 4  The new regime does not apply to
commercial fishing takes of endangered marine mammals, dolphins taken
during purse seine fishing in the Eastern Pacific Ocean tuna fishery or
California sea otters. 5
Section 118 also requires the Secretary to submit a progress report to
Congress by April 30, 1997Y.31 Fisheries that keep mortality and injury
to insignificant levels are not required to reduce their interactions
further.317 If the rate is not consistent with the zero mortality rate goal,
the Secretary is directed to take action through emergency rules.
309. 16 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(4) (1994).
310. MARiNE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 4(1995).
See also S. REP. No. 103-220, 12-16 (1994).
311. 16 U.S.C. § 1386(d) (1994) (the Secretary is to appoint three review groups
representing Alaska, Pacific Coast, Atlantic Coast with "a balanced representation of
viewpoints" from among affected coastal States, regional fish and wildlife managers,
Alaskan Native organizations and Indian tribes, and environmental and fishery groups).
312. Id. § 1386(a)(1)-(6), (b).
313. Id. § 1386(c).
314. Id. § 1387(a)(1). The specific deadline is April 30,2001. Id.
315. Id. § 1387(a)(2)-(4).
316. Id § 1387(b).
317. 16 U.S.C. § 1387(b)(2) (1994).
318. Id § 1387(b)(4).
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The take authorization program in subparagraph (c) incorporates many
of the elements of the Interim Exemption, including publication of a list
of fisheries, categorization of fisheries, and vessel registration.3"9 Autho-
rized vessels are required to display a decal, report takes, comply with
take reduction plans and emergency regulations, and take observers when
requested. 320 The Secretary may suspend or revoke the authorization from
vessels that do not comply with take reduction plans or emergency
measures, exposing such vessel masters or owners to the penalties of the
Act. 321
Subsection (d) of section 118 outlines a monitoring program to obtain
estimates of mortality and serious injury, corroborate the reliability of
reports, and identify changes in fishing methods or technology that could
increase or decrease marine mammal mortality and serious injury.3r The
measure sets out guidelines for placement of observers and places the
highest priority on observation of fisheries that have takes of endangered
marine mammals. 23 All incidental mortality and serious injury is to be
reported within forty-eight hours of the end of each fishing trip.324
The Secretary is required to develop take reduction plans to "assist in
the recovery or prevent the depletion of each strategic stock which
interacts with a [listed] commercial fishery."3  Each plan is to contain
measures that will reduce, within six months, incidental mortality in the
fishery to levels less than the PBR for the affected stock. 26 Within five
years, the goal of each plan is to reduce mortality to insignificant levels
approaching a zero rate.327 The plans are to be developed by teams drawn
from federal agencies, coastal states, regional fishery management
councils, interstate fisheries commissions, academic and scientific
organizations, environmental groups, commercial and recreational
fisheries groups, Alaska Native or Indian tribal organizations, and
319. Id. § 1387(c).
320. Id. § 1387(c)(3).
321. Id. § 1387(c)(4).
322. Id. § 1387(d).
323. 16 U.S.C. § 1387(d)(2), (3), (4) (1994).
324. Id. § 1387(e).
325. Id. § 1387(f)(1).
326. Id. § 1387(f)(2).
327. Id. § 1387(f)(2).
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others.328 Take reduction plans for stocks listed as endangered are to be
consistent with ESA recovery plans.329
The 1994 Amendments direct the Secretary to act in an emergency to
reduce incidental takes in cases where the incidental mortality in fisheries
is "having, or is likely to have, an immediate and significant adverse
impact on a stock or species."330 The provision mandates prescription of
emergency regulations, amendments to take reduction plans, or expedited
approval and implementation of plans to address adverse impacts. 3 ' The
Secretary must also prescribe emergency regulations to mitigate adverse
impacts where a plan does not exist or is not being developed, if a
fishery-even one categorized as rarely interacting with marine mam-
mals-is contributing to incidental mortality.332
M. Comparison of pre-1988 Amendments, 1988 Amendments,
Negotiated Proposal, and 1994 Amendments
Commentators have suggested that the 1994 Amendments to the MMPA
represented a retreat from the Act's protective stance on behalf of marine
mammals.33 The MMC observed that the amendments "instituted a
fundamental shift in the burden of proof applicable to taking marine
mammals," and that this shift "would reverse one of the basic concepts
built into the Act when it was passed in 1972."111
How the MMPA's policies and requirements have evolved over the past
two reauthorizations and whether those shifts run counter to the underly-
ing conservation goals of the Act has been questioned. An examination
of how several key issues emerged through the transition is useful in
determining how well the Act has fared.
328. Id. § 1387(f)(6)(C).
329. 16 U.S.C. § 1387(f)(11) (1994).
330. Id. § 1387(g).
331. Id. § 1387(g)(1)(A), (B).
332. Id. § 1387(g)(1)(C).
333. See George A. Chmael et al., The 1994 Amendments to the Marine Mammal
Protection Act, 9 NAT. RESOURCES AND ENV'T 19 (Spring 1995) (stating that "[t]his change
reveals that the Act has moved away from the concept of protecting each and every marine
mammal possible (a presumption of sacredness) to something akin to sustainable yield:
protecting stocks of mammal populations at levels high enough to ward off extinction.").
334. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORTTO CONrRES 5 (1995).
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1. Optimum Sustainable Population
In each succeeding reauthorization, the MMC, NMFS, interested
parties and Congress reaffirmed the underlying goal of the MMPA, which
is to maintain marine mammals at their OSP. The Kokechik case brought
to light the recognition that OSP could not be determined for many stocks
of marine mammals. Therefore, the Interim Exemption created by the
1988 Amendments was used to gather information so that the agency
could attempt to make such determinations. In the regime proposed by
NMFS subsequent to the 1988 Amendments, the concept of PBR related
directly to the policy of maintaining populations at OSP.33 "The goal of
the proposal-like the goal of the Act-was to have all marine mammal
stocks reach their optimum sustainable population." '336 This goal was
retained in the 1994 Amendments as well, which anticipated that OSP
determinations would be made as part of the stock assessment process,
where possible.337 The goal was also stated in the purposes for the
reauthorization.338
2. Zero Mortality Rate Goal
The zero mortality rate goal of the MMPA has been attacked by
fishermen as an impractical "zero tolerance" policy.339 Animal welfare
groups have invoked it to attempt to stop all takes of marine mammals. 40
In fact, the law mandates reductions in incidental takes to "insignificant
levels approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate."34' It does not
mandate "zero takes." Not only was the zero mortality rate goal retained
through the 1994 Amendments, but according to one of the bill's spon-
sors, "for the first time, the Secretary of Commerce [was] given regula-
tory authority to work toward achieving that goal .... "342 The amended
335. H.R. Rep. No. 103-439, at 24 (1994).
336. Id.
337. 16 U.S.C. § 1386(a)(5) (1994).
338. "[E]nsuring that the incidental take of marine mammals by commercial fishing
vessels does not reduce marine mammal populations below sustainable levels.... ." S. REP.
No. 103-220, at 10 (1994).
339. Sandi Doughton, Marine Mammals, Marauders of the Sea, THE MORNING NEws
TRm., July 11, 1993, atAl.
340. Sauer, supra note 15, at 419.
341. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
342. 140 CONG. REc. S4933 (daily ed. April 26, 1994) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
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Act also sets a seven year time limit during which commercial fisheries
are required to attain the goal. 43 Also included is a provision mandating
a progress review of all commercial fisheries by the Secretary of Com-
merce, commencing April 30, 1997."
3. Prohibition on Taking
It was argued throughout the reauthorization, and even after the 1994
Amendments, that changing the Act's permit requirements would weaken
the MMPA's prohibition on takes of marine mammals. 45 Before 1988,
the Act prohibited takes of marine mammals, but allowed NMFS to issue
"general permits" for large takes of marine mammals by both U.S. and
foreign fishers, as well as "small take exemptions" for U.S. fishers.346
During the interim exemption, takes had to be reported under the registra-
tion and logbook regime, but no other prior authorization was required,
nor was there a Secretarial finding.347 The prohibition on takes was not
lifted, and any interaction with a marine mammal by a fishing vessel
without registration and reporting exposed the vessel operator to prosecu-
tion and the full penalties of the Act. 4 Observer coverage was mandated
for portions of several fisheries.349
A major change in 1994 was that authorization to incidentally take
marine mammals could be made by the Secretary without the determina-
tions formerly required by section 103,350 and the permit applicant's duty
to perform stock assessments and determine the status of the stocks is now
341. 16 U.S.C. § 1387(b)(1) (1994).
344. Id. § 1387(b).
345. See, e.g., WHALES ALIVE! THE NEW (AND IMPROVED?) MARINE MAMMAL
PROTECTON ACT, (Cetacean Soc'y Int'l, Georgetown, Conn.), July 1994, at 1-2.
346. H.R REP. No. 103-439, at 22-23 (1994).
General permits could be issued provided that (1) the takings were from a non-
depleted marine mammal stock; (2) such takings would not disadvantage the stocks
involved; and (3) issuance of the permit was consistent with the purposes and policies
of the MMPA. Small take exemptions could be granted if(a) it was determined that
the total authorized taking would have a negligible impact on the stock; and (b) the
appropriate agencies provided guidelines for the establishment of a cooperative system
among fishermen to monitor and report such taking.
Id
347. 16U.S.C. § 1383a(1994).
348. Id. § 1383a(b)(3)(C). See also id. § 1375.
349. Id. § 1383a(e), (f).
350. Id. § 1387(c).
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with the Secretary.35' The 1994 Amendments do retain the registration
and reporting requirements of the Interim Exemption, and add oversight
and monitoring details based on what did and did not work during the
Interim Exemption." 2
Though some commentators state that this change is a step away from
the protective stance of the MMPA, in reality the requirement that permit
applications assess stocks and prove in a formal on the record proceeding
that they were at OSP occurred in only two instances in nearly two
decades. 3 It is questionable whether any but the largest and best
financed applicant fishing companies could afford the research and
analysis necessary to meet the requirement to prove not only that stocks
were at OSP, but that the proposed takes would be consistent with the
purposes of the Act. 4 Moreover, the exceptions to the moratorium and
the required findings were structured such that they could be met with
large, population level information and aggregation of many fisheries
under one permit.355
The 1994 Amendments retain the no take presumption.356 However,
authorization relies on Secretarial assessment of stocks and biologically
based determinations on a stock by stock and fishery by fishery basis of
what level of takes will not cause harm.357
Prior to 1988, intentional taking of marine mammals was allowed by
government employees in cases where such removals were necessary to
protect the welfare of the animal, or the public health and welfare. 8
Removal of nuisance animals was through non-lethal means only.359 In
1988, intentional takes of some marine mammals were allowed to protect
gear and catch.360 The 1994 Amendments eliminated this provision, but
created a provision to allow intentional harassment, and called for
Secretarial guidelines to describe non-harmful measures for deterring
marine mammals from causing property damage. 361
351. Id. § 1386(a).
352. Id. § 1387(e).
353. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
355. See supra Part II.E.
356. 16 U.S.C. § 1387 (1994).
357. Id.
358. Id. § 1379(h)(1).
359. Id.
360. Id. § 1383a(c)(3) (1988) (repealed in 1994).
361. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1387(a)(5), 1371(a)(4) (1994).
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4. Permits, Conditions and Regulations
The evolution of the MMPA through the 1988 and 1994 Amendments
changed from one of regulatory responses on all levels, with no distinc-
tion among stocks, fisheries, or circumstances, to a limited regulatory
response through the decal and logbook requirements under the Interim
Exemption, to a regulatory response on targeted, specific issues and
circumstances that warrant it based on the status of the affected marine
mammal stock.
One of the arguments during the reauthorization was that the proposed
regime shifted the burden of proof from the applicant who wanted to take
marine mammals, to the Secretary and NMFS.3 62 It is true that the
Secretary is required to publish stock assessments, and through scientific
peer reviews and status workshops, produce calculations and PBRs.363
Rather than an authorization to take marine mammals in an on-the-record
rulemaking for a specific stock, the stock by stock authorizations occur
through scientific calculation." The factors that are incorporated in the
PBR build in protective assumptions that weigh on the side of the produc-
tivity of the marine mammal stock in question. 6s It could be argued that
this process, which relies on information assembled by the agency who
has a duty to protect marine mammals, is in fact more protective than the
adjudicatory process, which relied on information assembled by the
proponent as to the status of the stock, and the degree to which the
proponent argued to a judge that its proposed taking would not cause
marine mammals any harm. As discussed above, the general permit
process was applied loosely to allow incidental takes across an array of
marine mammal populations, and the waiver of the moratorium occurred,
with two exceptions, in the absence of any definitive information from
either the agency or the permit applicants.
The 1994 Amendments changed the policy assumption to one that
recognizes that the agency is better equipped to assess marine mammal
362. Reauthorization of the Marine Mammal Protection Act: Hearings on H.R. 2760
Before the Subcomm. on Env't and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong. (1993) (statement of Nancy Foster, Acting Assistant
Administrator for Fisheries, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) [hereinafter
August 4 Hearing].
363. 16 U.S.C. § 1386 (1994).
364. Id. § 1386(a).
365. Id § 1386.
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stocks, their status and trends. 3' That job is more focused because it
categorizes stocks as meeting OSP or being strategic stocks.3 67 Because
science and information gathering by NMFS is then exposed to several
levels of scientific review, by the time an authorization to take marine
mammals occurs, scientific interests among all stakeholders are based on
the same level of information.
a. Observers
Although the MMPA made no mention of observers prior to the 1988
Amendments, NMFS had authority to place observers on foreign vessels
through international agreements that opened U.S. waters to their fishing
fleets.368 Most of the information on incidental take of marine mammals
came not through programs authorized under the MMPA, but under
salmon driftnet agreements and other foreign fishing allowances.3 69
For the first time, in the 1988 Amendments, Congress established an
extensive program for observation of fishing operations that required
coverage on certain portions of the fleet for the express purpose of
assessing marine mammal takes.37° The 1994 Amendments, while not
mandating a specific level of observer coverage, anticipate use of observ-
ers, and provide Secretarial authority to require it.371
b. Vessel Registration
A mandatory vessel registration program was one of the most hotly
contested issues in the 1994 Amendments. 372 Registration for purposes of
receiving an authorization to take marine mammals in the course of
fishing is a required element in the new regime.3 73 For the first time, the
Secretary has authority to revoke that authorization if the vessel owner or
366. The Authors base this assumption on 16 U.S.C. § 1386 (1994), which authorizes
the Secretary to make stock assessments.
367. 16 U.S.C. § 1386 (1994).
368. Id. § 1821(h).
369. Id. § 1822.
370. Id. § 1383a(e)(1). See also 54 Fed. Reg. 21,910 (1989).
369. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a(e)(1) (1994).
372. August 4 Hearing, supra note 362 (statements of Suzanne Iudicello, Center for
Marine Conservation; Brad Gilman, Gulf of Alaska Coalition; Sharon Young, International
Wildlife Coalition).
373. 16 U.S.C. § 1387(c)(2)(A) (1994).
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operator does not comply with the conditions of the authorization and take
reduction plan elements.374 The Interim Exemption required a vessel
registration program, but there was no revocation of the right to fish and
take marine mammals if a participant failed to report takes or complete
log books. Although the earlier permit process was harder to complete,
once the applicant received the authorization, the permits did not require
registration, reporting, observers, or any other oversight. 75 As discussed
above, such oversights were required sporadically, and letters of authori-
zation were made only to large associations, not individual vessels.
c. Secretarial Authority
The 1994 Amendments provided more authority to the Secretary with
regard to emergency authority to take action to protect marine mammals
than existed in previous revisions to the MMPA. The Secretary may
reduce takes in instances where interactions pose immediate adverse harm,
or the likelihood of such harm, to a strategic stock.376 Although the 1988
Amendments provided some guidance for emergency action, it was not
used. For example, in the case of harbor porpoise takes in the sink gilinet
fishery in New England, NMFS argued it was unclear that they could act
under the MMPA to protect harbor porpoises, despite the fact the animals
were proposed to be listed as threatened under the ESA and it was clear
that incidental takes in the fishery were causing significant mortalities."
N. Scientific Research and Conservation Planning
Although the MMPA has called for conservation plans since its
enactment, none have been completed. Furthermore, the process was
entirely within NMFS with no mechanism for advocacy groups or the
regulated community to participate in development of management
374. Id. § 1387(c)(4).
375. I § 1374.
376. Id. § 1382(e).
377. Gulf of Maine/Bay of Fundy Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Team, Take
Reduction Plan. 6-7 (Aug 7, 1996) (final draft, available from RESOLVE, Inc., Wash.,
D.C.) [hereinafter Harbor Porpoise Plan]. See generally SONJA V. FORDHAM, CENTER FOR
MARINE CONSERVATION, NEW ENGLAND GROUNDFISH: FROM GLORY TO GRIEF, A PORTRAIT
OF AMERIcA's MOST DEVASTATED FISHERY (1996) (discussing the history of harbor
porpoise take reduction efforts).
OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:149
measures. NMFS did stock assessments as money and research platforms
were available, but the status of most stocks was unknown.37 This lead
to the problems that arose in the Kokechik case.
The 1988 Interim Exemption attempted to create a mechanism to fill
these data gaps and to get a handle on the nature and extent of the
incidental take problem. 79 The mechanism included enhanced scoping
meetings, and consultations and comment periods with regard to develop-
ment of the new regime.8 The increased communication was particularly
evident between NMFS and the industry concerning reporting systems,
data management, and availability.38
During the development of the 1994 Amendments, notions about
planning evolved into an integrated process that is inclusive, formalized,
and focused. 2 As noted above, each step is laid out, with a template for
setting priorities, assessing stocks, assessing takes, calculating biologically
based caps, and applying the best available information to the management
process.383 The entire regime is built on scientific information and driven
by inclusive planning and adaptive management.
0. Ecosystem and Habitat Protection
Although the MMPA has stated from its original enactment that its
purpose was to maintain marine mammals as a "significant functioning
element of the ecosystem," the Act did not provide any specific direction
about habitat protection or ecosystem considerations. Nor did it give
managers any tools to address general marine ecosystem problems beyond
the actual taking of marine mammals. The 1988 Amendments did not
address the issue and prior to the 1994 Amendments, there were no
378. S. REP. No. 100-592, at 3-4 (1988).
379. See generally PROPOSED REGIME, supra note 144.
380. Id.
381. Herb Kaufmann, National Marine Fisheries Service, Presentation at the World
Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 15, 1993) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal Law
Journal).
382. During the negotiating sessions, fishermen, scientists, managers, and conservation
advocates each expressed a desire for more formalized access to both the scientific peer
review process and the rulemaking or regulatory process. This preference for more planning
and integration of stakeholder groups is reflected in both the Negotiated Proposal and the
resultant amendments to MMPA. Personal recollection and notes of authors.
383. See supra Part III.L.
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mechanisms to protect prey species or habitat areas essential to the
conservation of marine mammals.
The 1994 Amendments give the Secretary, for the first time, discretion-
ary authority to protect not just animals, but also their habitats.3u Con-
gress called for (and provided funding authorizations for) three "ecosys-
tem" studies: one for the Gulf of Maine, one for the Bering Sea, and one
for the Pacific region pinniped-fishery interactions."'
P. Public Participation in the Regulatory Process
It is the Authors' view that the 1994 Amendments improved the MMPA
by creating a more substantial role for public interest groups. The
creation of a multi-tiered scientific peer review process, the notice and
comment rulemaking elements of the regime at every step from publica-
tion of the list of fisheries to the open process of incidental take teams and
publication of their proposed plans, all combine to provide much more
access for public interests.
The formal, on-the-record rulemaking procedures of the pre-1988 Act
required not only substantial investment of resources in legal procedures,
but also necessitated that public interest groups make the case that they be
granted standing in an adjudicatory process taking place between NMFS
and the applicant." 6 Threshold issues of standing and qualifications had
to be addressed and met before any interest groups could participate.8 7
The hearing process, by its very nature, was formal and exclusive. While
interest groups took opportunities to influence government bodies such as
the Marine Mammal Commission or NMFS, in the final analysis, only
those who appeared before the Administrative Law Judge in the formal
hearing contributed to the decision making.388
384. 140 CONG. REc. H2724 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1994) (statement of Rep. Studds).
385. 16 U.S.C. § 1380 (1994).
386. See Regulations Governing the Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, 50
C.F.RL § 216.24 (1996). See also Kokechik, Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce,
839 F.2d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989).
387. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994).
388. YOUNG, ET AL., supra note 105. But cf Baur, New Approaches to Controlling
Incidental Take: What Have We Learned firom the History of MMPA Implementation? in
YOUNG ET AL., supra note 105, at 73, 76 (discussing NMFS proposal for an informal
rulemaking process).
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During the Interim Exemption, NMFS used notice and comment
rulemaking as well as a variety of meetings, briefings, and other venues
to keep stakeholders informed, and engaged in the development of the
overall regime, fishery identification, logbooks, reporting programs, and
data analysis. This inclusive effort contributed to a better-informed set of
players in 1994, during the amendment process, and added substantive
understanding to both the negotiations and eventual legislative action.
While the revisions to the MMPA over the past decade have considered
the interactions between marine mammals and fishing operations, they
have not necessarily "weakened" the Act or the measures and tools it
provides managers and the public for protection and conservation of these
species. The changes in each subsequent proposal, as they have evolved
over time, have built upon and contained elements of the prior regimes
and ideas. The Interim Exemption retained the fundamental elements of
the Act, and the MMC's guidance and proposal integrated prior legisla-
tive history as well as Congressional intent from the 1988 Amendments.
The NMFS proposal incorporated much of the Interim Exemption (for
example, lists and categories of fisheries) and advice from the Commis-
sion. The Negotiated Proposal based its biological and numerical analysis
on the concepts of PBR and ABR that were developed in the NMFS
proposal. Finally, the legislative outcome in the 1994 Amendments
picked up the priority setting focus and inclusiveness of the Negotiated
Proposal, as well as all the prior elements of the PBRs, the lists of
fisheries, the cautionary approaches of the Commission, and the practical
recommendations of NMFS and the fishing industry. Amending the
MMPA has been a cumulative process, not a substitutional one.
Where the regimes differed, the result was based on a process of
learning and modifying what worked during the Interim Exemption, what
didn't, and what would pass muster with scientists and agency managers.
In taking into account the reactions to the 1993 NMFS proposal, Congress
listened to comments of the fishing industry regarding the practicality of
some proposals, contentiousness of allocation elements and their concern
about cost. They also heard from those who opted out of the Negotiated
Proposal. By continuing to push, these animal welfare interests moved
Congress to adopt more protective approaches on several issues.
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF ThE 1994 AMENDMENTS TO THE MMPA
A. Regulations to Govern the Unintentional Taking of
Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing
Section 118 of the 1994 MMPA replaces section 114 of the 1988
MMEP. The process to develop the final regulations to implement section
118 was built upon the foundation established through the Negotiated
Proposal in the 1994 reauthorization by including many opportunities for
public participation. For example, NMFS conducted informal work
sessions" 9 to discuss the draft proposed regulations and possible revisions
to the draft regulations with individuals who had participated in the
development of the Negotiated Proposal.319
The proposed rule was published on June 16, 1995, 911 and NMFS held
public hearings in nine locations3" throughout the country to receive
comments on the proposed rule. NMFS received comments from fishers,
fishing industry groups, environmental groups, animal rights groups, state
departments of fisheries, other executive branch departments, and
members of the general public.393
The final regulations have a number of requirements for fishers.
Commercial fishers are required to annually register for an Authorization
Certificate by filing specified information.394 NMFS must provide for the
issuance of such certificates,395 and requires commercial fishers to report
to NMFS the incidental mortality and injury of any marine mammals in
the course of commercial fishing.396 Additionally, fishers are required to
comply with certain observer or other monitoring requirements,397 limits
on the type of deterrence methods that can be used to deter marine
389. Working sessions were held in Silver Spring, MD, on November 30, 1994, and
in Seattle, WA, on December 1, 1994. 60 Fed. Reg. 45,087 (1995).
390. Id
391. 60 Fed. Reg. 31,666, at 31,689 (1995).
392. Public hearings were held in Danvers, MA; Oceanville, NJ; Silver Spring, MD;
Ocean City, MD; Long Beach, CA; Ronkonkoma, NY; Anchorage, AK; Beaufort NC; and
Seattle, WA. 60 Fed. Reg. 45,087 (1995).
393. Id
394. 50 C.F.R. § 229.4 (1996).
395. 50 C.F.R. § 229.4(e).
396. 50 C.F.R. § 229.6.
397. 50 C.F.R. § 229.7.
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mammals from damaging fishing gear, catch, or other private property,39
and any applicable take reduction plan and emergency regulations. 31, The
intentional lethal take of any marine mammal is prohibited.4 °
The final regulations additionally permit takes of endangered and
threatened marine mammals for a period of three years."° However,
these permitted takes are predicated on the Secretary determining that the
take will have a negligible impact on the species or stock; that a recovery
plan has been or is being developed for such stock; that a monitoring
program has been established; and that a take reduction plan has been or
is being developed.40 2
B. Take Reduction Teams and Take Reduction Plans
Under the MMPA a take reduction plan is to be developed for each
strategic stock403 that interacts with a fishery that frequently or occasion-
ally kills or seriously injures marine mammals.4" Take reduction plans,
among other things, are to include recommended regulatory and voluntary
measures designed to reduce incidental mortality and serious injury, and
recommend dates for achieving specific objectives. 5 The immediate goal
of a take reduction plan for a strategic stock is to reduce, within six
months, incidental mortality and serious injury to levels less than the PBR
calculated in the stock assessment.4' The long-term goal of the plan is to
reduce incidental mortality and serious injury to insignificant levels
approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate within five years,
398. 50 C.F.R. § 229.40).
399. 50 C.F.R. § 229.9, § 229.4().
400. 50 C.F.R. § 229.3(e) (1996) (the prohibition does allow for the lethal take of
marine mammals if it is imminently necessary in self-defense or to save the life of a person
in immediate danger, and such taking is reported in accordance with the requirements of 50
C.F.R. § 229.6).
401. 50 C.F.R. § 229.20(a).
402. Id.
403. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (1994). A "strategic stock" is one for which the level of
direct human-caused mortality exceeds the PBR, which is declining and likely to be listed
as a threatened species under the ESA within the foreseeable future, or which is already
listed as threatened or endangered under the ESA or designated as depleted under the
MMPA. Id.
404. Id. § 1387(f).
405. Id. § 1387(f)(4).
406. Id. § 1386(f)(2).
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taking into account the economics of the fishery, existing technology, and
applicable state or regional fishery management plans .4 7
To date NMFS has convened five Take Reduction Teams (TRTs): (1)
the Gulf of Maine harbor porpoise take reduction team; (2) the Pacific
offshore cetacean take reduction team; (3) the Atlantic offshore cetacean
take reduction team; (4) the Atlantic large baleen whale take reduction
team; and (5) the Mid-Atlantic take reduction team. All five of these
teams have completed and submitted to NMFS draft take reduction plans
that are now in various stages of finalization. The following is a descrip-
tion of two of these teams.
1. Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Team
NMFS published the notice constituting the Gulf of Maine harbor
porpoise take reduction team in February 1996.40s The purpose and goal
of the harbor porpoise take reduction plan is to reduce immediately to
PBR the incidental take of harbor porpoise in the Gulf of Maine and the
Bay of Fundy Sink Gillnet Fisheries and to achieve insignificant levels of
take within five years.4"
The harbor porpoise take reduction team was unique. It had a history
of group efforts to define the extent of the incidental take and to reduce
that take.41 The harbor porpoise working group and the New England
Fishery Management Council under the Multispecies Fishery Management
Plan all had attempted the task.411
The harbor porpoise take reduction plan provides for an incidental take
of 376 harbor porpoise in the U.S. portion of the Gulf of Maine, out of
a PBR of 403 animals. 411 The core management plan achieves this
reduction through pinger use,413 acoustic devices that are meant to warn
cetaceans of the presence of a net, and time/area closures. In addition, it
prescribes an implementation plan that includes cooperation between
fishers and researchers in estimating gilinet fleet effort; fisher outreach,
407. Id.
408. 61 Fed. Reg. 5384 (1996).
409. Harbor Porpoise Plan, supra note 377, at 2.
410. See id. at 3.
411. Id. at 3-4. See also FORDHAM, supra note 377.
412. Harbor Porpoise Plan, supra note 377, at 12.
413. Ide at 14.
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training, and certification programs; and other mechanisms to strengthen
the potential for successfully meeting the plan's goals and objectives . 14
2. Pacific Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Team
The Pacific Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Team (POCTRT) was
charged with reducing the takes of strategic stocks, such as large toothed
and baleen whales (sperm and humpback whales) and a variety of smaller
whale species, in the drift gillnet fishery for swordfish and thresher shark
along the Oregon and California coast.415
The POCTRT take reduction plan relies on four primary strategies with
a strong contingency section in the event these strategies fail.416 The Plan
calls for immediate commencement of a test on pinger effectiveness. 7
It recommends that the fishery use nets that fish at least thirty-six feet
below the surface.418 The Team recommended continuing permit attrition
in California and conducting a thorough skipper education program.4 19 The
conservation community was particularly gratified at the strong language
on contingency measures if takes continue to exceed PBR levels. 20 At the
urging of the Center for Marine Conservation and other team members
the draft plan states "[if] ... the take reduction plan's objectives have not
been met, the TRT will evaluate and recommend methods to reduce
fishing effort in the upcoming season."421
3. Analysis of the Take Reduction Team Process as an Extension of the
1988 and 1994 Negotiation Process
Despite difficulties in balancing the need to reduce marine mammal kills
while minimizing the economic impact on fishers, the mediated process
has been successful in producing three consensus take reduction plans and
establishing better working relationships among the different interest
414. PROPOSED REGIME, supra note 144, at 4.
415. 61 Fed. Reg. 5385 (1996).
416. Final Draft: Pacific Offshore Cetacean Take Reduction Team, Take Reduction
Plan (Aug. 1996) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal).
417. Id. at 28-29.
418. Id. at24.
419. Id. at 38.
420. Id. at 46-5 1.
421. Id. at 46.
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groups. However, the TRT process is a new procedure for NFMS,
fishers and conservation groups, and the shift from adversarial advocacy
to a participatory planning exercise has left some of the players off
balance.4" NMFS is still struggling with how to implement the take
reduction plans in regulations, either under the MMPA or through fishery
management plans developed by the regional councils.4" Particularly for
those participants who were not at the negotiating table in either 1988 or
1993, there are obstacles of familiarity, acceptance and trust that have yet
to be overcome. Furthermore, each TRT is unique as it has its own
complex dynamics. For example, the harbor porpoise TRT had a lengthy
history together in its previous incarnation as the Harbor Porpoise
Working Group.4" In contrast, the Atlantic offshore team had several
participants who were hearing terminology and concepts for the first
time.425 As a result, they were less willing to accept the basic premises, let
alone the outcome.426 Moreover, the debate was colored by pre-existing
gear conflicts among the commercial fishing groups that had little to do
with the marine mammal conflicts. 27 However, the facilitators have been
essential in helping players get past these issues and move through
posturing to substance. Where the participants have been successful in
developing a consensus document, they look favorably upon the TRT
vehicle as a favorable alternative to the traditional adversarial notice and
comment rulemaking process.42 8
422. See Large Whale Take Reduction Team, Large Whale Take Reduction Plan, 7 (Feb.
1, 1997) (draft, available from The Keystone Center, Wash., D.C.); Atlantic Offshore
Cetaceans Take Reduction Team, Take Reduction Plan 1 (Nov. 22, 1996) (final draft,
available from RESOLVE, Inc., Wash., D.C.) [hereinafter Atlantic Cetaceans Plan];
MICHAEL L. WEBER, RESOLVE, CENTER FOR ENvIRONMENTAL DisPuTE RESOLUTOrN,
WASHINGTON, D.C., DiSPuTE RESOLUON IN MARINE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 3 (1996)
(Pub. No. 27).
423. Id
424. Marine Mammal Protection Act Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Env't and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
103d Cong. (1993) (statement of Andrew J. Read, Ph.D., Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution).
425. Atlantic Cetaceans Plan, supra note 420.
426. See supra note 422.
427. Id at 42-49.
428. See supra note 422.
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V. LESSONS To BE GAINED-OBSERVATIONS AND
OPINIONS OF THE AMENDMENT PROCESS
A. General Observations
As the reauthorizations of the MMPA have unfolded over the past eight
years, not only have we learned more about the status of marine mammals
and their interactions with the ecosystem and with humans, we have also
learned about the process by which resource managers, users of the
marine environment, and the public interact with each other, and about
public policy and the decision making process. A question arises as to
whether the lessons from succeeding MMPA reauthorizations may be
applied to other marine resource management settings.
The adversarial litigation set the stage for the 1988 Amendments,
under which the court, NMFS, Congress, and regulated industries
recognized they lacked critical information for management. The 1988
Amendments created a structure for gathering information, through the
MMEP, which set the stage for the 1993 process. Not only did the
MMEP provide facts, figures, and statistical information, but the process
by which it was developed and implemented provided important lessons
for the 1993 negotiations. What worked and what didn't in that program
informed the development of the 1994 Amendments. Perhaps the most
important of those lessons was that for any success, the agency charged
with implementing the plan must be an active participant in discussions
and negotiations. Another critical factor was Congressional support. If
the negotiation leading to a proposed legislative action had not had the
imprimatur of key committee leadership, enactment of both 1988 and
1994 Amendments would have been much more difficult.
It is important to state clear terms of reference from the onset of
negotiations, so that participants know up front what topics are on the
table. In both 1988 and 1994 external issues had the potential to block
progress. In the former case, tuna-dolphin conflicts in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean threatened to undo the entire deal struck on incidental take in U.S.
fisheries. In the most recent authorization, not only did external issues
arise independent of the negotiations (polar bear permits, public display
of marine mammals), the participants agreed at the outset that several
topics were taboo: pinniped management, so-called ecosystem impacts
from pinnipeds, and tuna-dolphin interactions.
Once terms of reference are established, the use and role of a facilitator
becomes apparent. In 1988, informal "conveners" and participants agreed
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on a series of talks and designated principal negotiators. However,
without formal ground rules, additional players continued to leave and
enter the talks, raising new issues, creating dilatory avenues of discussion
and impeding overall progress. They became their own independent
spokesperson and did not honor the tacit agreement that there were four
designated representatives who actually did the negotiating on behalf of
the two sides. In the 1994 negotiations, the participants, with the help of
the professional facilitator, established ground rules for the talks. The
most important ground rule being an agreement not to denounce the
process or the outcome, even if a group could not, in the final analysis,
"sign on" Despite this general agreement on terms, not all participants
adhered to every rule. The voluntary nature of processes such as these
means that no enforcement mechanism exists against participants who do
not agree to be bound by ground rules and terms. Furthermore, at some
point in any negotiation where compromise takes place, proponents of a
losing point of view may feel they can achieve better results by departing
from the consensus framework and advocating individually with the
decision makers. This occurred both in the 1994 legislative process, and
has appeared several times in the context of the incidental take teams.
Both the 1988 and 1994 negotiation processes were driven by congres-
sional deadlines. Expiration of provisions allowing commercial fishing
operations to interact with marine mammals were looming in both cases.
Not only this legal time frame, but self-imposed time limitations by the
negotiating group, pushed players to come to closure. Time limits called
for both facilitator and negotiators to set priorities, and identify what
issues they were most likely to achieve consensus on early in the process.
This establishes a foundation from which to attack the more contentious
issues later in the process. At the same time, it is important to recognize
that difficult issues require sufficient time, and any successful negotiation
needs at least one opening session where parties do little more than
"posture" and stake out territory before getting down to the business of
compromise.
One element that contributed to a successful process was changing the
traditional venue which allowed participants from outside Washington,
D.C. to have access to meetings. One drawback that became apparent
late in the negotiations was the lack of participation from regions of the
country where fishing associations were less well organized. A west coast
session would have provided access for participants there and a session in
New England might have drawn more participation from the conservation
and fishing communities there. In the long term, this would have benefit-
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ted the take teams. Individual fishers now participating on the take teams
do not recognize that there were stakeholders at the table from their
region. As a result, many are not invested in the underlying regime, and
are reluctant to buy off on what had already been agreed to by those
representatives.
Closed venues where negotiators are not distracted by workday
demands are important to enable them to focus on coming to agreement.
This isolation provides participants the opportunity to spend time outside
the negotiating room to foster relationships and create an atmosphere
where breakthroughs can occur in informal settings when negotiators have
dropped their "personae." It was apparent in the 1994 negotiations that
personal familiarity among individuals and experience from prior talks in
1988 and other settings set a stage of trust between players on the two
sides.
Another factor that contributed to trust and cooperation was the reliance
by policy analysts and lawyers upon their respective scientists. Small
group sessions, caucuses, and subject expertise groups assist movement
toward consensus by taking discussions out of large, plenary type ses-
sions. In the 1994 talks, breaking scientists away from the lawyers
proved especially useful because they could focus on their respective areas
of expertise, shared terminology, and objective approaches. By finding
agreement on science, they were able not only to contribute to, but also
to free up the lawyers for discussions of process.
A common element to the 1988 and 1994 negotiations and implementa-
tion of the 1994 Amendments has been lack of scientific information upon
which to develop policy and make management decisions. Scientists play
a vital role in developing management regimes in light of an imperfect
science. Moreover, the importance of participation by scientists in the
negotiations has implications for later action in the take reduction teams
and subsequent implementation. By integrating scientists in policy
formulation, the negotiation process insures that the players most likely
to be engaged as resource managers are in on the process from the ground
up.
In the 1994 negotiations, participants deliberately set out to separate the
scientific assessment from the regulatory regime, by creating stock
assessments, independent peer-reviews, and consultations. The goal of
this approach was to create greater confidence in the science upon which
management measures were based. This notion has proven accurate. The
success of deliberations in the take reduction teams has correlated to each
group's ability to accept the underlying stock assessments and PBRs, even
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if they are "imperfect" science, and move forward to discuss conservation
measures. Through participation in the peer reviews and consultations,
scientists who then participate in the subsequent management discussions
provide the context for the rest of the team and help bring fishers and
conservationists to a better understanding of the origins of the calcula-
tions. Discussions appear to fare better if there is a person on the take
team who was part of a regional scientific review group which reviewed
the stock assessments and PBRs. Additionally, given the imperfection of
our existing best available data, the take reduction plans often recommend
further research and data collection. The scientist on the take team can
then act as a liaison with the regional scientific peer review group to
ensure that these recommendations are given attention. Finally, participa-
tion by scientists makes the scientific aspects of the tnanagement process
more transparent. Because fishers tend to be skeptical and challenge data,
the presence of a person with scientific expertise lends credibility to the
underlying scientific information.
While many aspects of the negotiation process carry over to the take
team planning process, there are several aspects of negotiation leading to
legislative action that do not apply to the implementation phase. For
example, interest groups who are mobilized for the legislative process
disappear when it comes to implementation. There is only a small number
of participants who are consistently available for implementation meet-
ings; state representatives are hard pressed to fit commitment for ongoing
negotiation into their schedules. Participatory regimes require a substan-
tial amount of time, money, and committed participation to work.
Another difference between legislative advocacy and the "neg reg"
mode is that in the legislative realm, a Congressional champion or
proponent can provide significant impetus to the process. This not only
helps push the group toward consensus, it can discourage "end runs"
around the negotiation process if congressional leadership makes it clear
they will favor the consensus document over adversarial attempts to strike
separate deals. This aspect is missing from most administrative rule-
making.
It remains to be seen whether exempting the take teams from the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) z9 has helped the process by
allowing for more creativity, spontaneity, and a broader selection of
participants. The risk is that teams existing outside FACA are simply
429. 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1971).
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"consultative," not formal advisors to the Secretary. On the other hand,
although FACA status gives a group some credibility and stature, the
appointment process is much more burdensome, and FACA committees
are more restricted in that participants are treated as "federal officials" for
purposes of ethics and other rules.
In the existing framework, the take teams have authority and influence
to the degree that their recommendations are adopted by the Secretary in
take reduction plans. Further, if the Secretary does not incorporate the
take team's recommendations, section 118 requires the Secretary to
respond to the team and explain why not.
In at least some instances, the consultative nature of the teams has
tended to create an atmosphere where dissatisfied members of the teams
have expressed the view that they could do better outside the process.
Facilitators have noted that fishers and advocates will only participate if
they believe they will do better by building consensus than by lobbying
their specific interests directly with the agency.
Finally, one aspect of the 1994 Amendments and the take reduction
team process that has been uniformly expressed is the need for public
outreach to stakeholder groups. Relationships between the regulated
community and the regulating agency are not always cooperative.
Sometimes too little trust exists between advocacy groups and the regu-
lated community. Whether they agree to come together to work on
building consensus to reduce incidental mortality of marine mammals in
fishing operations is a matter of time, and experience with examples of
approaches that work. One important recognition is that there are appro-
priate roles for government, advocacy groups and industry, and it may not
be realistic for all to do each kind of activity.
B. Can Comparable Negotiation Processes
be Applicable in Other Settings?
Recent amendments to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (FCMA) provide authority to fishery management
councils to use negotiated rulemaking in development of fishery manage-
ment plans.43 Some commentators have questioned whether the process
applied during the MMPA reauthorization and underway now in the
430. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
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incidental take reduction teams could be used in fisheries management as
well.
There are some inherent obstacles. The MMPA and FCMA have
different mandates; the first one being protective and the latter largely
allocative. Even if the negotiation process were applicable, there may be
other obstacles. "The use of dispute resolution techniques such as
negotiation and mediation is hampered by the legal and institutional inertia
that resists risking change and by the number and diversity of interests
among participants in individual fisheries."431 Another obstacle is the
diversity and large number of individual fishers, who each must be
engaged and embrace a defined problem before beginning dispute
resolution.
Introduction of dispute resolution into fisheries management will likely
have greater success in discrete fisheries where the number of fishermen
is relatively small and the management issues generally recognized.
Experience in these less challenging circumstances will generate the
awareness needed before undertaking dispute resolution in the majority of
fisheries, where participants are more numerous and controversies and
problems are more complex.432
VI. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, the overall regime governing the incidental take of
marine mammals in commercial fishing will need further refinement. It
is too soon to assess the effectiveness of the incidental take reduction
teams, as many of the take reduction plans have yet to be published in
final form. Furthermore, when comparing the timetables for implementa-
tion of the take reduction plans to the timing of 1997 assessment of
progress toward reducing takes to below PBR and achieving progress
toward the zero mortality rate goal, it is clear that NMFS may not be able
to fully evaluate progress under this regime at that time.433
Authorization for appropriations runs through fiscal year 1999. Thus,
the Act will need reauthorization or amendments in 1999.414 The MMPA
431. See Weber, supra note 422, at 3.
432. Id. at 6.
433. According to the harbor porpoise plan, the gillnet fishery must achieve PBR by
August 1997, however, according to the MMPA they must achieve PBR by April 1, 1997.
Harbor Porpoise Plan, supra note 377.
434. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1384, 1407 (1994).
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requires the Secretary to review the progress of all commercial fisheries
who are moving toward reducing incidental mortality and serious injury
to insignificant levels approaching a zero rate by April 30, 1997. 431 The
1996 stock assessments indicate that pinniped populations on the west
coast are increasing. 436 These increases foreshadow the difficult issues for
this upcoming reauthorization.
For example, the Fishermen's Alliance of Monterey Bay has petitioned
Congress to reinstate the commercial fishing exemption provisions that
allow fishers to use intentional lethal force to protect their gear and catch
from damage by marine mammals, and to amend the MMPA to allow for
a limited number of licenses to take (in this case kill) "six" pinnipeds per
year at the discretion of the individual licensee.437 The Washington State
Legislature tried unsuccessfully to enact legislation calling for lethal
research on seals and sea lions.4 38 The Pacific States Marine Fisheries
Commission is considering changes to the MMPA to allow lethal removals
of pinnipeds. At this date, it is the Authors' view that it may be difficult
to maintain the ban on shooting marine mammals that interfere with gear
and catch.
In the same vein, ecosystem management continues to be a buzz word
that may encompass anything from habitat protection to reducing popula-
tions of pinnipeds viewed as competitors to fishers. Not only is it unclear
what the term means, no one has suggested how to do it, and whether we
have the capacity to do it even if we knew what it was. According to one
commentator at a Congressional symposium on ecosystem management,
"there is not enough agreement on the concept to hinder its popularity." '439
It is this vagueness about what "ecosystem management" is that makes it
unclear whether the ecosystem studies called for in the MMPA will result
in recommendations that call for integrated management and holistic
435. Id. § 1387(b)(3).
436. NATIONAL MARINE FIsHERIEs SERVICE, 1995 MARINE MAMMAL STOCK
ASSESSMENTS; U.S. PAciFIc, ATLANTIC AND GULF OF MEXIcO NOAA Tech. Memorandum
(1995).
437. Petition from the Fishermen's Alliance of Monterey Bay to Senator Larry Pressler,
Chairman, Commission on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Sept. 5, 1995) (on file
with Authors).
438. Seal and Sea Lion Killing Legislation Dies in Washington State Legislature, (Mar.
13, 1996) <mail@cserve.cmc{internet: Marmamed@uvic.ca> (on file with Ocean and
Coastal Law Journal).
439. Statement of M. Lynne Corn, Coordinator, Address at Ecosystem Management
Symposium (Mar. 24, 1994).
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approaches in the marine environment, or whether they will produce
proposals for removals of species that prey on fish in order to benefit
humans who want to prey on the same fish.
Another concern that the industry voiced during the negotiations and the
reauthorization was the "three-fold" conservatism of the elements making
up the equation for setting PBRs. Through their scientists' participation
on the various peer review groups, the fishing industry has continued its
attacks on PBR as too conservative, and will likely want to reopen
consideration of the calculation in the next reauthorization.
From the other direction, marine mammals continue to evoke emotional
responses from the public. Some of the criticism that the 1994 Amend-
ments were not protective enough, and that the shift of the burden of
proof moved away from the Act's policy of protection, may engender
efforts to turn back the clock. It is unclear whether the policy direction
that has been moving away from protecting each individual animal toward
protecting populations and systems will prevail, or whether the idea that
marine mammals are "sacred" will re-emerge. For example, the agency
continues to encounter problems with public interactions with marine
mammals. Increasing populations of both humans and marine mammals
along the nation's coasts have brought about not only competition for
space on boats, docks and beaches, but have given rise to conflicts
between a public which wants to feed and get close to these wild crea-
tures, and wildlife management policy that argues against such interac-
tions. Further complicating the picture are the complaints of property
owners who suffer when marine mammals don't distinguish between
robbing fish out of commercial gear and food from the hand of generous
citizens. The same public that Wants to protect individual animals doesn't
want them sitting on their yachts and defecating.
The recent reforms in the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act, many of which reflect the kind of precautionary thinking that
traditionally has informed marine mammal regimes (but not fisheries
management), may indicate that the two approaches are converging. The
1996 Amendments to FCMA have moved that statute away from a focus
on commercial utilization and more toward rebuilding and protection. In
the Authors' view, there may be potential in thinking about a merger of
regimes for protecting, conserving, and managing marine fish and
wildlife.
From a scientific standpoint, we have over the past twenty years created
a regime for mammals aimed at rebuilding stocks that had been severely
depleted by commercial harvest. Now we are beginning to recognize that
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our excessive capacity and technology for fishing, and our inability or
unwillingness to limit this fishing power, has reduced between thirty and
forty percent of our commercially valuable fish stocks to dangerously low
levels, and we need to rebuild them. As we consider whether it is
possible or desirable to bring marine mammals into equilibrium with their
ecosystems when their numbers are abundant and increasing, it may also
be time to consider whether more protective approaches, such as no take
reserves, may be necessary to rebuild severely depleted fish populations.
Whether it is time to consider managing marine mammals and fish
together requires a three-fold analysis that includes science, policy, and
law considerations. What is the scientific basis for defining an ecosystem
and whether and how it is functioning among its component parts? To
what degree have humans already "reset" the system by reducing carrying
capacity for marine mammals, fish, birds and other wildlife through
increased population, coastal development, pollution, global climate
change and a host of other anthropogenic effects? What are the human
values that inform our policies with regard to marine mammals and fish?
Where are the tradeoffs between our needs for food, economic develop-
ment, and growth and our desire for abundant wildlife and clean oceans?
How do we communicate those values among stakeholders and between
interested parties so that they are at least understood, if not shared? And
finally, how do we communicate consensus, as well as competing values,
to decision makers? If we have the scientific information and we know
what the public policy choices are, can the legal regimes be crafted to
move what has been single species management into ecosystem manage-
ment?
Based on groundwork laid with the 1994 Amendments to the MMPA,
we have some critical components: enhanced public participation, peer
review, alternative dispute resolution and underlying policy agreement
that provide a basis for articulating and understanding the relative values
of the differing user groups and stakeholders. The required stock
assessments, status reviews, ecosystem studies, and biologically based
check points provide much of the data that could be useful in making
determinations about the status and role of marine mammals in their
respective marine systems. Only after the science and the policy have met
and been made clear to decision makers and the public is it time to call in
the legislative drafters to find ways to merge living marine resource laws
to create a legal regime for management that is multispecies, holistic, and
ecosystem based.
